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Ethnically Segmented Markets:
Korean-Owned Black Hair Stores
FELIX B. CHANG*
Races often collide in segmented markets where buyers belong to one ethnic group
while sellers belong to another. This Article examines one such market: the retail of
wigs and hair extensions for African Americans, a multi-billion-dollar market
controlled by Korean Americans. Although prior scholarship attributed the success
of Korean American ventures to rotating communal credit, this Article argues that
their dominance in ethnic beauty supplies stems from collusion and exclusion.
This Article is the first to synthesize the disparate treatment of ethnically
segmented markets in law, sociology, and economics into a comprehensive
framework. Its primary contribution is to forge the concept of ethnically segmented
and misaligned (ESM) markets, where buyers and sellers are ethnically distinct from
one another.
ESM markets challenge entrenched paradigms in antitrust. In the wigs and
extensions market, the endurance of Korean American retailers confounds
conventional notions of market power, which is measured at the firm level. This
market suggests that numerous in-group incumbents can compete intensely with one
another but collaborate to stymie out-group insurgents.
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INTRODUCTION
Segmented markets are the product of markets dividing to serve groups with
similar supply or demand preferences.1 In ethnically segmented markets, that
division occurs due to ethnic or racial preferences. For instance, an all-white
homeowners’ association might exclude African Americans from a neighborhood to
inflate home values, thereby segmenting its housing stock.2 More innocuously,
grocery stores in a diverse city might cater to the segmented food preferences of its
ethnic residents.3

1. See MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETITIVE STRATEGY: TECHNIQUES FOR ANALYZING
INDUSTRIES AND COMPETITORS 196–200 (1980).
2. See Daria Roithmayr, Racial Cartels, 16 MICH. J. RACE & L. 45 (2010). Similarly,
labor markets might be segmented along the lines of occupation, geography, race, education,
and immigration status. See Michael Reich, David M. Gordon & Richard C. Edwards, Dual
Labor Markets: A Theory of Labor Market Segmentation, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 359 (1973);
William T. Dickens & Kevin Lang, Labor Market Segmentation Theory: Reconsidering the
Evidence, in LABOR ECONOMICS: PROBLEMS IN ANALYZING LABOR MARKETS (William Darity,
Jr. ed., 1993).
3. See Ogenyi E. Omar, Alan Hirst & Charles Blankson, Food Shopping Behavior
Among Ethnic and Non-Ethnic Communities in Britain, 10 J. FOOD PRODS. MKTG. 39 (2004).
Some markets, such as ethnic foods, are more susceptible to consumer crossover than others,
such as ethnic beauty products. With ethnic foods, debates of purity versus fusion replicate the
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The most puzzling—and disconcerting—ethnically segmented markets, however,
are ones where consumers hail from one ethnic or racial group while sellers hail from
another. Such markets present a conundrum: why are buyers and sellers ethnically
distinct?
The piecemeal literature on ethnically segmented markets does not provide a
satisfactory answer. In economics, the debate has revolved around whether racial
preferences are inefficient and, by extension, whether ethnically segmented markets
should yield to market integration over time.4 Neither side convincingly explains
why some ethnically segmented markets thrive as a misalignment of ethnically
distinct buyers and sellers.5 After all, ethnically homogenous consumers should
prefer to buy from co-ethnic producers.6
Legal scholars tend to examine ethnically segmented markets from the side of
producers rather than consumers. Borrowing from antitrust theory, race and law
scholars have framed the exclusion of peoples of color from housing and labor
markets as a mechanism of racial cartels.7 In law and development circles, one camp
of scholars has emphasized structural explanations for the dominance of ethnic
groups in niche markets, typically against the backdrop of exclusion of all peoples
of color from mainstream economies.8 By contrast, another camp has fixated on the
institutions, relationships, and private ordering peculiar to ethnic communities.9 In

economic discourse on market segmentation and integration while upping the cultural ante.
See, e.g., Roxana Hadadi, Alison Roman, the Colonization of Spices, and the Exhausting
Prevalence of Ethnic Erasure in Popular Food Culture, PAJIBA (May 9, 2020),
https://www.pajiba.com/celebrities_are_better_than_you/alison-roman-and-the-exhaustingprevalence-of-ethnic-erasure-in-popular-food-culture.php [https://perma.cc/XJ27-2ZAY].
4. See GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (2d ed. 1971).
5. See Amanda Lea Robinson, Internal Borders: Ethnic-Based Market Segmentation in
Malawi, 87 WORLD DEV. 371 (2016).
6. In fact, silos of co-ethnic buyers and sellers mark societies that are characterized by
high degrees of interethnic tension and economic fragmentation. See id.
7. See Roithmayr, supra note 2, at 51 (defining racial cartels as “groups in which
members agree to artificially fix wages, property values, political power and other price-like
analogues, by restricting supply, dividing up markets, or colluding to achieve other
commercial conditions”).
8. See, e.g., Eleanor Marie Lawrence Brown, The Blacks Who “Got Their Forty Acres”:
A Theory of Black West Indian Migrant Asset Acquisition, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 27 (2014)
(examining structural factors giving entrepreneurs from the West Indies a leg up, in
comparison with other Black Americans).
9. See, e.g., Lan Cao, Looking at Communities and Markets, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
841 (1999) (examining rotating credit associations in immigrant communities); Amy L. Chua,
Markets, Democracy, and Ethnicity: Toward a New Paradigm for Law and Development, 108
YALE L.J. 1 (1998) (correlating the success of some “market-dominant minorities” with their
cultural dispositions); BARAK D. RICHMAN, STATELESS COMMERCE: THE DIAMOND NETWORK
AND THE PERSISTENCE OF RELATIONAL EXCHANGE (2017) (linking the success of certain
ethnicities in the diamond industry with intra-ethnic exchanges and relationships); Teemu
Ruskola, Conceptualizing Corporations and Kinship: Comparative Law and Development
Theory in a Chinese Perspective, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1599 (2000) (tracing the development of
Chinese corporate law to traditions of family and kinship).
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totality, however, legal scholars have not articulated a comprehensive theory of
markets that are both ethnically segmented and ethnically misaligned.
Sociology presents the most exhaustive treatment of these markets, though it, too,
falls short in explaining the persistence of ethnic misalignment. Here the seminal
work revolved around middleman minorities—sojourners such as Chinese, Jewish,
Indian, Korean, and Lebanese merchants who mediate between majority and other
minority groups.10 Over time, this framework morphed into “ethnic entrepreneurs”
to cover non-itinerant groups.11 Nonetheless, it continued to miss the business tactics
that enable in-group sellers to maintain dominance over out-group competitors.12
To unify the disparate approaches across law, economics, and sociology, this
Article articulates a theory for the endurance of ethnically segmented markets where
producers hail from one ethnicity while consumers hail from another—a concept this
Article calls ethnically segmented and misaligned (ESM) markets. As its first step,
the Article proffers a definition of ethnically segmented markets that encompasses
all three disciplines. The Article’s central contribution is to bring clarity to this
concept, which has spanned multiple fields with no coherent framework.
Focusing on the retail of wigs and hair extensions to African Americans, which is
dominated by Korean American firms, this Article illuminates that most peculiar of
segmented markets—where buyers and sellers are ethnically homogenous but
misaligned. The size of the market for wigs and extensions is estimated at $6
billion.13 It is delineated along racial lines, with African American women
comprising the largest segment.14 Due to a confluence of societal pressures and

10. See HUBERT M. BLALOCK, TOWARD A THEORY OF MINORITY-GROUP RELATIONS
(1967); Edna Bonacich, A Theory of Middleman Minorities, 38 AM. SOCIO. REV. 583 (1973);
see also CHINESE MIGRANTS IN RUSSIA, CENTRAL ASIA AND EASTERN EUROPE (Felix Chang &
Sunnie Rucker-Chang eds., 2012); VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS IN THE CHINESE DIASPORA
(Khun Eng Kuah-Pearce & Evelyn Hu-Dehart eds., 2006).
11. See IVAN LIGHT & EDNA BONACICH, IMMIGRANT ENTREPRENEURS: KOREANS IN LOS
ANGELES 1965–1982 17 (1988); see also Zulema Valdez, Beyond Ethnic Entrepreneurship:
An Embedded Market Approach to Group Affiliation in American Enterprise, 15 RACE,
GENDER & CLASS 156 (2008).
12. But see IN-JIN YOON, ON MY OWN: KOREAN BUSINESSES AND RACE RELATIONS IN
AMERICA (1997) [hereinafter YOON, ON MY OWN]; In-Jin Yoon, The Growth of Korean
Immigrant Entrepreneurship in Chicago, 18 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 315 (1995) [hereinafter
Yoon, Korean Immigrant Entrepreneurship].
13. Susan Adams, Long on Hair: The World’s First Venture-Backed Human-HairExtension Company Wants to Be the Airbnb of Salons, FORBES, Sept. 27, 2019.
14. See Black Impact: Consumer Categories Where African Americans Move Markets,
NIELSEN (Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.nielsen.com/us/en/insights/article/2018/black-impactconsumer-categories-where-african-americans-move-markets/
[https://perma.cc/YA6DZQYL] (“African Americans have cornered the ethnic hair and beauty market, ringing up $54
million of the $63 million total industry spend in 2017.”). On opportunities for disruption in
the African American segment, see Tamison O’Connor, Building the Glossier of the Black
OF
FASHION
(Nov.
14,
2019),
https://www.
Hair
Market,
BUS.
businessoffashion.com/articles/beauty/freddie-harrel-radwan-hair-extensions-wigs
[https://perma.cc/AQB8-SESM].
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beauty standards, African American women are steadfast consumers;15 hence,
demand in the market is inelastic, which tends to confer market power to producers.16
This Article argues that Korean American sellers (the market’s main producers)
maintain dominance not through structural or cultural advantages, but by collusion
and exclusion. In mainstream economies, these strategies are employed by so many
dominant firms that they have become the staple of antitrust cases.17 In ESM markets,
however, coordination and exclusion assume a sociological dimension, with
anticompetitive effects reinforced by co-ethnic bonds.18 During the 1970s, a
combination of economic forces, racial structures, and shifting beauty standards
initially propelled Korean-owned firms to power.19 This Article focuses on how
Korean American retailers leveraged and maintained that power in the face of
challenges by African American competitors. In these markets, retailers managed to
band together intra-ethnically and fend off competition interracially through tactics
that can be conceptualized as antitrust offenses.
Antitrust is an apt springboard for analysis because African Americans often
frame their relationship with Korean American retailers in anticompetitive terms. It
is often asserted that Korean American firms exert a “monopoly” over, and have
“monopolized,” Black beauty supply stores.20 Yet monopoly and monopolization
have specific meanings that demand careful market power analysis.21 Working
through the requisite steps infuses the literature on these buyer-seller interactions
(and, accordingly, interethnic interactions) with rigor. Further, the interactions
between African American buyers and Korean American sellers occur wholly
outside the ambit of the state and therefore out of the purview of public law. That
race relations often unfold as private transactions under private law is well

15. See infra Section II.A.
16. See infra Section III.A.1.
17. See, e.g., Interstate Cir., Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939) (finding that the
parallel insertion of price maintenance clause into exhibition contracts by film distributors led
to inference of collusion); Am. Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921)
(holding that information exchange among hardwood manufacturers facilitated by trade
association found to constitute price fixing); United States v. Foley, 598 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir.
1979) (holding that communication among otherwise competing realtors facilitated their
conspiracy to raise commission rates).
18. This is not entirely straightforward. While Korean Americans can appeal to ethnic
solidarity and utilize publications and associates to facilitate information exchange, intraethnic competition is intense. See LIGHT & BONACICH, supra note 11, at 193–93.
19. See Jason Petrulis, “A Country of Hair”: A Global Story of South Korean Wigs,
Korean American Entrepreneurs, African American Hairstyles, and Cold War
Industrialization, 22 ENTER. & SOC’Y 368 (2021); Ku-Sup Chin, In-Jin Yoon & David Smith,
Immigrant Small Business and International Economic Linkage: A Case of the Korean Wig
Business in Los Angeles, 1968-1977, 30 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 485 (1996). This history has
entered popular imagination as well. See NICOLA YOON, THE SUN IS ALSO A STAR (2016).
20. See Edward Tony Lloneau, How and Why Korean Owned Beauty Supply Stores
Dominate in the Afro Community, LIQUID GOLD BLOG (Sept. 8, 2013)
http://www.liquidgoldbonding.com/blog/?p=126 [https://perma.cc/VL2T-46Y8].
21. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION
AND ITS PRACTICE 92 (4th ed. 2011).
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understood.22 Arguably, where transactions between races can be characterized as
buyer-seller transactions, as in ESM markets, laws governing commerce are more
appropriate than antidiscrimination laws as a point of entry.
Insights about ethnically segmented markets can push the boundaries of antitrust
as well. The endurance of Korean American firms suggests that collusive and
exclusionary schemes may be more stable than antitrust theory holds. Further,
measuring market power at the firm level may not always be appropriate. While the
literature on cartels has centered on a small number of large producers,23 coordination
among a multitude of small firms in ESM markets is possible.24 This coheres with
the axiom from sociology that an ethnic group withdraws into itself, strengthening
co-ethnic bonds, when threatened by exogenous forces.25 This Article’s second major
contribution is therefore the discovery that in-group producers can coordinate against
and exclude out-group competitors by utilizing ethnic bonds.
The remainder of the Article proceeds as follows: Section I synthesizes the
treatment of ethnically segmented markets in law, economics, and sociology to
provide an edifice for the concept. Section II introduces the market for wigs and hair
extensions as a template for ESM markets. Section III works through the market
power of Korean American retailers. In doing so, it considers how this market pushes
the boundaries of antitrust doctrine. Finally, Section IV anticipates how the infusion
of race and ethnicity upends several assumptions in antitrust.
Before this Article proceeds further, an explanation of terminology is in order.
First, this Article refers to “ethnically” segmented markets rather than “racially”
segmented markets even though the latter could suffice for the retail of wigs and hair
extensions to African Americans. African Americans, of course, are a racialized
group,26 while Korean Americans are an ethnicity within the Asian American racial
group.27 Their misalignment in this market is both ethnic and racial. Nevertheless,

22. Debate over the scope of public law to cover private actions stretches as far back as
the Reconstruction Amendments. See HEATHER COX RICHARDSON, WEST FROM APPOMATTOX:
THE RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICA AFTER THE CIVIL WAR 204–05 (2007); George Rutherglen,
State Action, Private Action, and the Thirteenth Amendment, 94 VA. L. REV. 1367, 1372
(2008). More recent discourse on the relevance of private law to interethnic relations includes,
for example, Cao, supra note 9; RICHMAN, supra note 9.
23. The classic study is Reinhard Selten, A Simple Model of Imperfect Competition,
Where 4 Are Few and 6 Are Many, 2 INT’L J. GAME THEORY 141 (1973). See also Margaret C.
Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, What Determines Cartel Success?, 44 J. ECON. LITERATURE
43 (2006); Andrew R. Dick, When Are Cartels Stable Contracts?, 39 J.L. & ECON. 241 (1996).
24. See infra Section II.B.
25. Beleaguered merchants are likely to withdraw into “distinctive cultural and
organizational forms,” thereby resisting integration. Jonathan H. Turner & Edna Bonacich,
Toward a Composite Theory of Middleman Minorities, 7 ETHNICITY 144, 154 (1980).
26. See MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES
122 (3d ed., 2014). Recent scholarship, however, has come to view race as a power construct,
rather than social construct. See, e.g., FELIX B. CHANG & SUNNIE T. RUCKER-CHANG, ROMA
RIGHTS AND CIVIL RIGHTS: A TRANSATLANTIC COMPARISON 24 (2020); ACHILLE MBEMBE,
NECROPOLITICS (2019).
27. For a thorough literature review of ethnicity, especially in the context of Asian
Americans, see YEN LE ESPIRITU, ASIAN AMERICAN PANETHNICITY: BRIDGING INSTITUTIONS
AND IDENTITIES 1–10 (1992).
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the Article adopts “ethnic” for consistency with the sociological literature, which
refers to ethnic entrepreneurs.28 This also attains a greater degree of precision
regarding the producers (i.e., Korean Americans), rather than subsuming them in a
larger racial category (i.e., Asian Americans, whose diverse constituents exhibit
differing rates of entrepreneurship). This specificity is consistent with the antitrust
notion that markets must be defined as narrowly as possible to accurately capture
market power.29
I. DEFINING ETHNICALLY SEGMENTED MARKETS
Existing treatment of ethnically segmented markets is, for lack of a better word,
segmented along disciplines. Law, economics, and sociology have all tackled
ethnically segmented markets, but through their narrow disciplinary confines. This
Section assembles a definition of ethnically segmented markets from the disparate
but complementary scholarship, with a view toward illuminating the markets at the
crux of this Article. Ultimately, this Section arrives at the following definition of
ethnically segmented and misaligned markets: buyers are ethnically homogenous and
exhibit similar demand preferences but are served by producers who are themselves
ethnically homogenous but also ethnically distinct from buyers.
A. Contributions from Law
1. Market Division
Law’s primary contribution to ethnically segmented markets is the insight from
antitrust that markets divide. They divide naturally, as a result of consumer
preferences, and artificially, as a result of coordination to boost and maintain market
power. These divisions form the basis for market segmentation along the
demarcations of ethnicity. Other legal concepts, such as racial cartels and the
interplay between markets and ethnicity, build upon this intuition of segmentation.
Every market can be broken down into a product market and a geographic
market.30 A product market might segment along price points, while a geographic
market might splinter to reflect logistical challenges. For instance, the vast market
for hotels is indisputably segmented along high-end and budget options, with a large
and amorphous segment in the middle. In New York City, the Four Seasons and the
Mark Hotel might be interchangeable with each other but not with budget motels.31

28. See infra Section II.B.
29. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 21, at 92 (“A relevant market is the smallest grouping of
sales for which the elasticity of demand and supply are sufficiently low that a ‘hypothetical
monopolist’ . . . could profitably reduce output and increase price . . . .”).
30. Id.
31. Compare Bao Ong, 15 of the Most Expensive Hotel Suites in New York City,
ARCHITECTURAL DIGEST (Jan. 3, 2017), https://www.architecturaldigest.com/gallery/mostexpensive-hotel-suites-in-new-york-city [https://perma.cc/PUN5-4AM8] ($50,000/night for
the most expensive suite at the Four Seasons and $75,000/night at the Mark), with
HOTELS.COM (search for two-star hotels in New York City) (last accessed July 31, 2021)
(approximately $100–150/night for a two-star hotel). The two extremes are not
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New York City may not even comprise one geographic market. Arguably, high-end
hotels in Staten Island are not interchangeable with high-end hotels in Midtown
Manhattan.32
With ethnically segmented markets, product markets are divided along ethnic
lines. In a metropolis as large and diverse as Los Angeles, it would be foolhardy to
define the grocery store market as all grocery stores in Los Angeles County. The
product market is segmented along ethnic lines, tracking the tastes and preferences
of the city’s multitude of residents.33 This holds for even smaller slivers of the
county. Thus, all grocery stores in the Mid-Wilshire area of Los Angeles cannot be
lumped into one product market; given the area’s diversity, grocery stores catering
mostly to Chicano patrons might not be interchangeable with stores catering mostly
to Ethiopian or Korean patrons. Further, considering the snarl of Los Angeles traffic,
geographic markets should be drawn more compactly than in other cities. Thus, even
if Asian grocery stores comprise a single product market, we might aptly define
Asian grocery stores in Monterey Park and West Covina as separate geographic
markets, even though both are located in the San Gabriel Valley.34 The ten miles that
separate these two neighborhoods might be prohibitively far for a customer to drive
to save, say, ten percent, on the cost of groceries.35
2. Racial Cartelization and Exclusion
Notably, market segmentation—including ethnic segmentation—can arise from
more heavy-handed forces than product preferences or ease of transportation.
Producers, rather than consumers, might divide markets to maintain market power—
i.e., their ability to increase profits by reducing output and charging supracompetitive
prices.36 Famously, a bar review course provider ceded the Georgia market to another
provider in exchange for a covenant not to compete outside the state; thus, each
monopolized a portion of the national market.37 In heterogenous product markets,

interchangeable, meaning customers at either end are unlikely to cross over into the other
segment. This is the hallmark of delineating a market, with boundaries drawn only around
products that are not interchangeable or substitutable.
32. Business and luxury travelers to Midtown Manhattan may be inclined to stay close to
the center of financial activity or tourist attractions.
33. As an illustration of the aptness of the “ethnic” segmentation label, saying that grocery
stores in Los Angeles are segmented along racial lines might even be too imprecise. The many
ethnicities racialized as Hispanic, for instance, may diverge in culinary preferences. See
Vanessa Fonseca, Nuevo Latino: Rebranding Latin American Cuisine, 8 CONSUMPTION,
MKTS. & CULTURE 95, 100–01 (2005).
34. On the demographic fluctuations of Monterey Park, see Keith Aoki, Direct
Democracy, Racial Group Agency, Local Government Law, and Residential Racial
Segregation: Some Reflections on Radical and Plural Democracy, 33 CAL. W.L. REV. 185
(1997).
35. For a discussion of the ten percent figure, see HOVENKAMP, supra note 21, at 95–96.
36. See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956); see
also Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Robert H. Land & Steven C. Salop, Monopoly Power and
Market Power in Antitrust Law, 76 GEO. L.J. 241 (1987).
37. Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc., 498 U.S. 46 (1990).
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firms might specialize in specific products to minimize overlap and attain market
power.38
This nefarious strain of market segmentation informs what race and law scholars
have coined as “racial cartels.”39 Just as several producers with small market shares
can band together to divide a market among themselves, all-white associations can
cartelize a market to raise economic, social, and racial status.40 Coordination foments
power. More concretely, white unions went on strike to prevent employers from
hiring Black and Chinese workers, thereby restricting the pool of available labor and
boosting earning within that pool.41 White homeowners’ associations persuaded
homeowners to adopt racially restrictive covenants that prevented home sales to
African Americans, Asian Americans, and Latinos, thereby ensuring White
ownership of homes and boosting home values.42 The Democratic Party purged
Black members between the 1880s and the 1950s to lock up political power.43 In
each instance, Whites segmented the markets—for labor, for homes, and for political
representation—along racial lines and inflated pricing and power through strategies
of cartelization and exclusion.
From racial cartels, we discover that even small and discrete numbers can band
together to concoct and execute exclusionary schemes. As we shall see, this pushes
against the antitrust notion that cartels fare best when members are few and large and
markets are concentrated.44 We can also begin to understand how some markets
remain ethnically misaligned: through the hard work of cultivating oligopolies and
exclusion.
3. Interplay Between Ethnicities and Markets
Legal scholars have posited alternating theories for why certain markets are
dominated by ethnically homogenous producers. One fixture among law and
development scholars is Amy Chua, whose inquiries into “market-dominant ethnic

38. Kenneth M. Davidson, The Competitive Significance of Segmented Markets, 71
CALIF. L. REV. 445, 454 (1983).
39. See Roithmayr, supra note 2; see also Darrell A.H. Miller, Racial Cartels and the
Thirteenth Amendment Enforcement Power, 100 KY. L.J. 23 (2011). Roithmayr relies on the
work of Robert Cooter. See Robert Cooter, Market Affirmative Action, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
133, 153–57 (1994).
40. See DARIA ROITHMAYR, REPRODUCING RACISM: HOW EVERYDAY CHOICES LOCK IN
WHITE ADVANTAGE (2014).
41. See id. at 25–26; BETH LEW-WILLIAMS, THE CHINESE MUST GO: VIOLENCE,
EXCLUSION, AND THE MAKING OF THE ALIEN IN AMERICA 40–43 (2018).
42. See Jacob S. Rugh & Douglas S. Massey, Segregation in Post-Civil Rights America:
Stalled Integration or End of the Segregated Century?, 11 DU BOIS REV.: SOC. SCI. RSCH. ON
RACE 205 (2014); NEIGHBORHOOD AND LIFE CHANCES: HOW PLACE MATTERS IN MODERN
AMERICA (Harriet B. Newburger, Eugenie L. Birch & Susan M. Wachter eds., 2011);
Roithmayr, supra note 2, at 52–53; see also Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding
that racially restrictive covenants violate equal protection).
43. Roithmayr, supra note 2, at 65–70.
44. See Richard A. Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J.L. & ECON.
365 (1970); George A. Hay & Daniel Kelley, An Empirical Survey of Price Fixing
Conspiracies, 17 J.L. & ECON. 13 (1974); HOVENKAMP, supra note 21, at 159.
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minorities” began in the 1990s, soon after the Los Angeles riots and the fall of the
Soviet Union.45 Professor Chua noted the similarities binding these minorities
worldwide, who tend to transact with “impoverished” and “disadvantaged”
“indigenous” majorities.46 She conjectured that economic and political liberalization
fueled interethnic conflicts by strengthening the hand of the market-dominant
minorities.47 While some of Professor Chua’s subsequent writings provoked
controversy,48 her work in this area remains influential.
Other scholars have examined the traits and communal practices within certain
ethnic groups that fuel high rates of entrepreneurship. Here studies of the kye, or
rotating credit systems in the Korean community, are emblematic.49 In rotating credit
systems, members contribute money on a regular basis into a communal pot and take
turns withdrawing from the pot.50 For law scholars, rotating credit signifies a broader
pattern of informal arrangements held together by trust, ethnic solidarity, and
decentralized information exchange—features endogenous to, and built up within,
ethnic communities.51 To be sure, these scholars are cognizant of structural factors.
Lan Cao, for instance, devotes plenty of discussion to why certain groups (e.g.,
Koreans, Chinese, and Mexicans) can amass capital while others (e.g., African
Americans) cannot.52 Hence, this literature might be characterized as bottom-up
studies of the endogenous and sociocultural factors that contribute to ethnic
entrepreneurship.53
In a similar vein, Barak Richman has written on the control over the diamond
industry exerted by ethnic groups who rely on private systems of contract

45. See Chua, supra note 9; AMY CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE: HOW EXPORTING FREE MARKET
DEMOCRACY BREEDS ETHNIC HATRED AND GLOBAL INSTABILITY (2003) [hereinafter CHUA,
WORLD ON FIRE].
46. CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE, supra note 45, at 6–7. Professor Chua’s work has limited
applicability to ethnically segmented and misaligned markets. In the U.S., buyers and sellers
in these markets tend to be minority groups themselves; the dynamics are different and
altogether fluid.
47. Id. at 9. On the use of competition law as a corrective to the influence of marketdominant minorities, see Eleanor M. Fox, Equality, Discrimination, and Competition Law:
Lessons from and for South Africa and Indonesia, 41 HARV. INT'L L.J. 579 (2000).
48. Professor Chua’s subsequent books include AMY CHUA & JED RUBENFELD, THE
TRIPLE PACKAGE: HOW THREE UNLIKELY TRAITS EXPLAIN THE RISE AND FALL OF CULTURAL
GROUPS IN AMERICA (2014), which would be criticized for suggesting that some minority
groups are innately dominant and interethnic tension is inherent. See, e.g., Jennifer Lee & Min
Zhou, From Unassimilable to Exceptional: The Rise of Asian Americans and “Stereotype
Promise,” 16 NEW DIVERSITIES 7 (2014).
49. Other examples include the Chinese and Vietnamese “hui,” the Japanese “tanamoshi,”
the Cambodian “thong thing,” the Mexican “cundina,” the Ethiopian “ekub,” and West Indian
“esusu.” Cao, supra note 9, at 848.
50. These informal arrangements are often the primary source of funding for starting
businesses. See id. at 879–81.
51. See id.; see also Lan Cao, The Diaspora of Ethnic Economies: Beyond the Pale?, 44
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1521 (2003).
52. See Cao, supra note 9, at 879.
53. Id. at 863.
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enforcement.54 Jewish merchants in New York, for instance, owe their success to
intra-ethnic institutions that enforce executory contracts and enable payment for
diamonds on credit.55 Like the kye, these institutions function outside the auspices of
any government, so Professor Richman calls them “stateless commerce.”56
Ethnic trading networks are also stateless in the sense that they cross national
boundaries. The diamond trade is a transnational business controlled at certain
junctures by specific ethnic groups, particularly Jewish merchants—just as wigs and
hair extensions for African Americans are manufactured, distributed, and sold in a
transnational chain where Koreans and Korean Americans predominate. Where the
wigs and hair extensions market departs from the case studies of Professors Cao and
Richman, however, is in its ethnic misalignment between producers and consumers.
For the diamond markets to resemble this ESM market, customers would have to be
ethnically homogenous peoples of color who are ethnically distinct from the
merchants. Moreover, diamonds would have to be indispensable to conform with
mainstream aesthetic standards,57 and co-ethnic sellers would have to be virtually
nonexistent.58 Thus, while the bottom-up endogenous scholarship directs our
attention to the institutional factors of Korean success (and those institutions
certainly exist), ethnic misalignment of the wigs and hair extensions market requires
that we consider two groups: purchasers and consumers.
At the other end of law and development scholarship are academics who look
exclusively at structural explanations for the success of specific ethnic groups.59
Eleanor Brown, for example, positions her work on property rights as a complement
to cultural approaches toward West Indian immigrants and their descendants, who
exhibit much higher rates of entrepreneurship than other racialized Black
Americans.60 Professor Brown relates the success of Black West Indians to their early
exposure to property and contract rights as landholders on the islands.61 Land sales
financed the emigration of West Indians, who, upon arrival in the United States, took
advantage of their experiences to acquire land and build wealth at substantially
greater proportions than “native” African Americans.62 Interestingly, Caribbean
families often became landlords to local African Americans.63

54. See Barak D. Richman, Contracts and Cartels: Reconciling Competition and
Development Policy, in COMPETITION LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 155 (D. Daniel Sokol et al.
eds., 2013); Barak D. Richman, How Community Institutions Create Economic Advantage:
Jewish Diamond Merchants in New York, 31 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 383 (2006) [hereinafter
Richman, Community Institutions]; RICHMAN, supra note 9.
55. Richman, Community Institutions, supra note 54, at 389.
56. RICHMAN, supra note 9, at xi.
57. See infra notes 183–86 and accompanying discussion.
58. See infra note 200 and accompanying discussion.
59. Some scholars would place structural and cultural views in the same category, one
emphasizing that certain institutions and cultural features determine behavior. At the other end
is the agency or functionalist view, which emphasizes that individuals create institutions to
serve their interests and needs. See AVNER GREIF, INSTITUTIONS AND THE PATH TO THE MODERN
ECONOMY: LESSONS FROM MEDIEVAL TRADE 12–13 (2006).
60. See Brown, supra note 8.
61. Id. at 41–42.
62. Id. at 49.
63. Id. at 52 n.90.
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The relationship between Korean Americans and African Americans in the wigs
and hair extensions market is even more visibly different because it is interracial. Of
course, no discussion of Korean American–African American relations is complete
without mentioning that for all the relative difference in their stations, both are
peoples of color excluded from participation in the mainstream economy. Therefore,
their interactions have often been pushed to niches in urban landscapes where
frictions are bound to arise.64 Smoldering for decades, these frictions exploded into
riots in Los Angeles in 1992, when Korean American businesses were vandalized
after the acquittal of the White police officers who beat Rodney King and the Korean
American storeowner who shot Latasha Harlins.65 Law scholars with a structuralist
bent were quick to underscore the similarities in systemic exclusion of both Asian
Americans and African Americans, frequently with the blessing if not at the direction
of the state.66 Asian American legal scholars, who were gaining prominence in the
academy, called for the emergence of critical Asian American scholarship in the
tradition of critical race theory.67 For all the shared legacy of discrimination and
exclusion, however, when Korean American and African American interactions
assume market dimensions, such as buyer-seller transactions, tensions can be
exacerbated.68
From the structuralists, this Article extrapolates the lesson that ethnically
misaligned buyers and sellers are pushed into close quarters by racial and
macroeconomic forces. Departing from this starting point, however, the Article also
scrutinizes the efforts of Korean American sellers to maintain the dominance that
systemic forces conveyed them. To explain the persistence of ethnic misalignment,
especially in the face of challenges to sellers by out-group upstarts, the Article turns
toward endogenous or bottom-up perspectives to examine mechanisms adopted by
in-group sellers. While this approach might be out of fashion in legal circles, given
the popularity of systemic analyses, it is consistent with more recent sociological
work, which has emphasized the agency of ethnic entrepreneurs.69

64. See Kwang Chung Kim & Shin Kim, The Multiracial Nature of Los Angeles Unrest
in 1992, in KOREANS IN THE HOOD: CONFLICT WITH AFRICAN AMERICANS 17 (Kwang Chung
Kim ed., 1999); Yoon, Korean Immigrant Entrepreneurship, supra note 12, at 328.
65. Kyeyoung Park, Use and Abuse of Race and Culture: Black-Korean Tension in
America, in KOREANS IN THE HOOD, supra note 64, at 60; Melvin L. Oliver, James H. Johnson,
Jr. & Walter C. Farrell, Jr., Anatomy of a Rebellion: A Political-Economic Analysis, in
READING RODNEY KING/READING URBAN UPRISING 117 (Robert Gooding-Williams ed., 1993);
see also Genaro Molina, How the Killing of Latasha Harlins Changed South L.A., L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 18, 2016.
66. See, e.g., Sumi K. Cho, Korean Americans vs. African Americans: Conflict and
Construction, in READING RODNEY KING, supra note 65, at 196; Lisa C. Ikemoto, Traces of
the Master Narrative in the Story of African American/Korean American Conflict: How We
Constructed “Los Angeles,” 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1581 (1993); Reginald Leamon Robinson,
“The Other Against Itself”: Deconstructing the Violent Discourse Between Korean and
African Americans, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 15 (1993).
67. See, e.g., Robert S. Chang, Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical
Race Theory, Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 1241 (1993).
68. Kim & Kim, supra note 64.
69. See infra Section I.B.
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B. Contributions from Sociology
Sociology laid the foundation for ethnicity and entrepreneurship, providing basic
definitions and theoretical frameworks.70 To this day, much of the innovative
scholarship on ethnic markets resides in sociology. In 1967, Hubert Blalock devised
the term middleman minority to describe minority entrepreneurs who mediate
between dominant and subordinate groups.71 This concept became indelibly
associated with Edna Bonacich, who posited that middlemen minorities succeed
because they are sojourners or economic migrants intent on saving aggressively.72
Together with Ivan Light, Professor Bonacich conducted a series of ethnographic
studies on Korean Americans, finding that this community exhibits high rates of
entrepreneurship relative to other ethnic groups.73 Korean American firms compete
by employing family members at low wages, thereby utilizing social networks to
amass capital and control expenses.74 Their businesses also gravitate toward certain
sectors (e.g., retail) and neighborhoods (e.g., impoverished or lower middle class).75
The middleman minority framework broadened into an ethnic or immigrant
entrepreneur framework to encompass non-sojourning communities.76 Subsequent
studies on Korean American entrepreneurs added to Light and Bonacich’s
observations, confirming that low-margin retail businesses in low-income
neighborhoods function as the entry-point for most Korean Americans, who, after
having saved enough, trade up for ventures in more prestigious industries and higherincome neighborhoods.77 These scholars also compiled a more sophisticated portrait
of Korean American small businesses that relate their success back to two additional
factors: (i) bilateral trade between the United States and Korea, which facilitated the
import of manufactured goods from Korea and enabled Korean Americans to
construct retail infrastructures for those goods; and (ii) a high degree of vertical
integration of retail and import, which achieved efficiencies—but also fostered
exclusion of out-group competitors.78

70. On basic definitions of, and the link between, ethnicity and entrepreneurship, for
example, see Howard E. Aldrich & Roger Waldinger, Ethnicity and Entrepreneurship, 16
ANN. REV. SOCIO. 111, 112 (1990) (defining “ethnic group” as membership in a group with a
common origin and culture that is reinforced by social structures and “entrepreneurship” as
combining resources in novel ways to create something of value).
71. HUBERT M. BLALOCK, TOWARD A THEORY OF MINORITY-GROUP RELATIONS 79
(1967).
72. See Bonacich, supra note 10, at 585.
73. See LIGHT & BONACICH, supra note 11.
74. Id. at 185–86; Yoon, Korean Immigrant Entrepreneurship, supra note 12, at 328–29.
75. LIGHT & BONACICH, supra note 11, at 179–84, 205–26.
76. See id. at 18. The sense of perpetual foreignness engendered by the immigrant
framework would have been damaging to the very groups these sociologists studied. For a
fuller discussion of the theories of ethnic economies, see IVAN LIGHT & STEVEN J. GOLD,
ETHNIC ECONOMIES 5–23 (2000).
77. Jennifer Lee, Retail Niche Domination Among African American, Jewish, and Korean
Entrepreneurs: Competition, Coethnic Advantage and Disadvantage, 42 AM. BEHAV. SCI.
1398, 1403–04 (1999).
78. Id. at 1410; see also NANCY ABELMANN & JOHN LIE, BLUE DREAMS: KOREAN
AMERICANS AND THE LOS ANGELES RIOTS 136 (1995).
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The paradigm shift to ethnic and immigrant entrepreneurs paved the way for
ethnographies of other communities, often in fascinating contradistinction from coracial groups. Scholars compared entrepreneurship rates and strategies of Cuban
Americans to Mexican Americans, for instance, or Mexican Americans to African
Americans.79 By unpacking the intersections of ethnicity with race, class, and gender,
they have been able to distinguish ethnic communities prone to entrepreneurship
from racialized minorities who, due to structural conditions or the absence of class
and ethnic resources, could not replicate the conditions necessary for widespread
business formation.80
Undertaking comparative analyses, sociologists ascertained that some ethnic
groups thrived because they were able to integrate vertically and horizontally.81
Writing in 1982, Kenneth Wilson and Allen Martin theorized that ethnic
communities utilizing in-group networks to organize in this way could replicate the
advantages of dominant firms in the mainstream economy to squeeze out higher
profits per unit of demand.82 As proof, they applied input-output econometric
analyses to compare the production capacities of Cuban Americans and African
Americans in Miami, finding that the former can source from in-group firms and
retain capital within co-ethnic communities at far higher rates than the latter.83
Vertical integration has been observed between Korean American retailers and
suppliers as well.84
For Korean and Korean American entrepreneurs in the United States, Cold War
diplomacy and South Korean institutions played a pivotal role in their commercial
success. South Korea provided a transnational connection to low-cost labor and
manufacturing. Equally importantly, South Korean banks helped finance Korean
American small businesses.85 Entrepreneurs were also able to employ family

79. See ZULEMA VALDEZ, THE NEW ENTREPRENEURS: HOW RACE, CLASS, AND GENDER
SHAPE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE 26 (2011).
80. For a concise literature review, see Valdez, supra note 11, at 158.
81. See Kenneth L. Wilson & W. Allen Martin, Ethnic Enclaves: A Comparison of the
Cuban and Black Economies in Miami, 88 AM. J. SOCIO. 135 (1982).
82. Id. at 138.
83. Id. at 143–47.
84. See Yoon, Korean Immigrant Entrepreneurship, supra note 12, at 331:
The vertical integration between Korean retailers and suppliers is another
strong feature of Korean immigrant businesses . . . . Korean retailers say
that they receive some benefits or special services from Korean suppliers.
For example, extended credit terms, lower prices and easy access to
information are the main benefits gained from having Korean suppliers.
Since Korean suppliers dominate general merchandise, clothing,
footwear, and wig trades, Korean retailers can get early information about
which items have recently arrived and which ones are “hot.”
85. See Tamara K. Nopper, Revisiting “Black–Korean Conflict” and the “Myth of Special
Assistance”: Korean Banks, US Government Agencies, and the Capitalization of Korean
Immigrant Small Business in the United States, 1 KALFOU: J. COMP. & RELATIONAL ETHNIC
STUD. 59, 67 (2014).
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members in their ventures, thereby suppressing labor costs through kinship and coethnic networks.86
As we assemble the literature on ethnically segmented markets, it is important to
be mindful of sociology. Sociology keeps legal scholars “honest” about ethnicity, so
to speak, by helping us stay attuned to the dynamism of racial and ethnic formation.87
Recognizing that race and ethnicity are constructs whose boundaries are fluid, we
understand that the interethnic conflict in ESM markets is not inevitable. Indeed, the
static representation of ethnicity—and therefore the inevitability of ethnic conflict—
was one of the many criticisms of Professor Chua’s writings.88 Generations pass and
their descendants acculturate; whatever the values or inclinations of first-generation
immigrant entrepreneurs, their children may feel differently about the communities
where they do business.89
In return, there is much that antitrust can teach sociologists as well. The literature
on vertical integration in ethnic economies is now nearly half a century old.90 Some
of it treats horizontal coordination and vertical integration equivalently,91 as
tantamount to a monopoly.92 These are fighting words in antitrust; there, the doctrine
has developed frameworks for thinking through when monopolies ensue, what
monopolization is, and when coordination and integration should be condemned.
C. Contributions from Economics
Economics is fundamental to our understanding of markets, and economic
principles heavily influence antitrust. For our purposes, three lines of economic
scholarship are informative. First, there has been a longstanding debate about the
relevance of antidiscrimination laws from an economics perspective. Among the
earliest, and certainly the loudest, volleys fired on this point came from the Chicago

86. LIGHT & BONACICH, supra note 11, at 176–77.
87. On the process of racial formation, see OMI & WINANT, supra note 26, at 109.
88. See Edmund Terrence Gomez, Inter-ethnic Relations, Business and Identity: The
Chinese in Britain and Malaysia, in THE STATE, DEVELOPMENT AND IDENTITY IN MULTIETHNIC SOCIETIES: ETHNICITY, EQUITY AND THE NATION 31, 32 (Nicholas Tarling & Edmund
Terrence Gomez eds., 2008) (“[Chua’s] perspective tends to homogenise ethnic communities
and to essentialise their pattern of enterprise development.”); STEVEN B. MILES, CHINESE
DIASPORAS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF GLOBAL MIGRATION 256–57 (2020).
89. See Elaine H. Kim, Home is Where the Han Is: A Korean American Perspective on
the Los Angeles Upheavals, in READING RODNEY KING, supra note 65, at 215 [hereinafter Kim,
Home is Where the Han Is]. Concomitantly, we also see that traumatic episodes, such as the
LA riots, can accentuate ethnic solidarity. Rose M. Kim, Violence and Trauma as Constitutive
Elements in Korean American Racial Identity Formation: The 1992 L.A.
Riots/Insurrection/Saigu, 11 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 1999, 2012–14 (2011) [hereinafter Kim,
Violence and Trauma].
90. A similar strain is the “ethnic cartel” model. For a discussion, see RICHMAN, supra
note 9, at 107–08.
91. See Wilson & Martin, supra note 81, at 137.
92. See LIGHT & GOLD, supra note 76, at 20–21 (“Korean business owners monopolized
the wig business before federal prosecutors brought suit under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.
While they enjoyed their monopoly, Korean business owners excluded non-Koreans from the
wig industry, and raised prices of wigs to consumers.”).
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economist Gary Becker, who posited that racial discrimination is inefficient because
it artificially steers transactions toward in-group members rather than permitting outgroup but more efficient alternatives.93 For instance, White employers with a “taste
for discrimination” might hire only White workers even though Black workers might
be more productive and demand lower wages.94 Over time, as his theory goes, the
markets would correct the distortions of discrimination, with nondiscriminators
driving discriminators out of business.95 In the above example, White employers
would eventually gravitate toward Black workers, forcing a stabilization of wages
between White and Black workers. With the markets’ self-correction,
antidiscrimination laws were unnecessary.96
Becker’s thesis came at the height of U.S. antidiscrimination laws and ushered in
a conservative backlash rooted in shaky microeconomic theory. The thesis has been
thoroughly qualified, if not utterly discredited,97 though Professor Becker’s other
writings have influenced scholarship of ethnic entrepreneurs.98
For our purposes, and as our second line of scholarship to examine, the related
discourse on the durability of market segmentation is more relevant. The lesson from
the early microeconomics-infused lens on race is that segregation is inefficient.99 As
time takes its course, transactions should proceed toward the equilibrium of
efficiency. This hypothesis applies to various settings, with the common theme that
markets and communities should move toward integration. Thus, across vastly
different industries, market segmentation is viewed as an aberration. Financial
markets are inefficient where producers are siloed, fostering redundancy in market
infrastructures.100 Labor unions are interpreted as artificial in addition to unjust
where peoples of color are excluded.101 And trade barriers, a form of geographic
market segregation, are construed as artificial distortions of price, which should
otherwise trend toward uniformity.102

93. See BECKER, supra note 4.
94. Id. at 19–21.
95. Id. at 43–45; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 21.1
(1972).
96. See BECKER, supra note 4, at 45.
97. See, e.g., Robert E. Suggs, Poisoning the Well: Law & Economics and Racial
Inequality, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 255 (2005).
98. See, e.g., Richman, Community Institutions, supra note 54, at 387–88 (accounting for
the possibility that Jewish institutions developed and internalized knowledge that allowed
Jewish merchants to flourish in the diamond trade, in accordance with Becker’s theory of
human capital suggests); Cao, supra note 9, at 865 n.84 (incorporating Becker’s work on
norms into an understanding of community norms surrounding informal contracts).
99. Becker himself posited that tastes for discrimination might grow large enough to
foster segregation and preempt intercommunal trade, to the detriment of each isolated
community’s welfare. See BECKER, supra note 4, at 22–23.
100. See Mike Reece, Competition or Consolidation?: The Outlook for Interoperability
Among European CCPs, THOUGHT (J.P. Morgan), May 1, 2012 (comparing the siloed nature
of financial market infrastructures in Europe versus the U.S.).
101. Roithmayr, supra note 2, at 51.
102. See Robinson, supra note 5, at 372 (discussing the Law of One Price, which
hypothesizes that each product should have one price globally and where disparities arise, they
are due to trade frictions).
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In diverse societies, then, the persistence of ethnically segmented markets might
be attributed to unnatural forces such as interethnic suspicion. In Malawi, for
example, the political scientist Amanda Lea Robinson has analyzed the spatial
distribution of the country’s numerous ethnic groups and concluded that ethnic
market segmentation is partially the result of intra-ethnic trust.103 To minimize the
risks of informal commerce, farmers and traders opt to transact only with in-group
counterparties.104
Nonetheless, ethnic groups can come to so dominate an economic niche that
consumers cannot turn to co-ethnic suppliers. For an explanation, and as our third
line of scholarship to examine, some economists have turned to institutions peculiar
to those ethnicities. New institutional economics (“NIE”) defines institutions as
“written and unwritten rules, norms and constraints that humans devise to reduce
uncertainty and control their environment.”105 Broadly construed, institutions cover
written rules and agreements governing private relations, constitutions and laws
governing society, and unwritten codes of conduct.106 In his seminal book on
institutions, for instance, Avner Greif traces Western dominance to the development
of institutions during the medieval era that fostered growth.107 Most prominently, it
was the rise of corporations such as guilds, fraternities, and professional
organizations—institutions centered neither on state nor kin but on self-interest and
self-governance—that propelled Europe’s growth.108
Given its emphasis on hard and soft law as institutions fundamental to economic
success, NIE has provided the foundations for law scholars’ studies of ethnic
economies.109 As we shall see, institutions spurred the ascension of Korean
merchants in the African American wigs and hair extensions market. However, we
will also move beyond intra-ethnic and communal factors to evaluate Korean
American strategies for keeping competitors at bay. Because the market for the sale
of wigs and hair extensions to African Americans is ethnically misaligned between
consumers and producers, we must consider the part that producers played in
maintaining their edge over out-group competitors—specifically, African American
retailers, whom consumers would likely have preferred.
Altogether, prior writings from law, sociology, and economics point to the
following quandary for ESM markets: given the dynamism of racial and ethnic
formation as well as the transience and inefficiency of market segmentation, why are
some ethnically segmented markets perpetually misaligned? Existing work (e.g., by
NIE scholars) provides partial answers. But to fully explicate this quandary, the
remainder of the Article focuses on one of the country’s most iconic but
misunderstood ESM markets.

103. Id.
104. Id. at 380.
105. Claud Menard & Mary M. Shirley, Introduction, in HANDBOOK OF NEW
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 1, 1 (Claud Menard & Mary M. Shirley eds., 2008).
106. Id.
107. See AVNER GREIF, INSTITUTIONS AND THE PATH TO THE MODERN ECONOMY: LESSONS
FROM MEDIEVAL TRADE (2006).
108. Id.; see also Avner Greif, Family Structure, Institutions, and Growth: The Origins
and Implications of Western Corporations, 96 AEA PAPERS & PROC. 308, 309 (2006).
109. See, e.g., RICHMAN, supra note 9 at 91, 169.
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II. THE MARKET FOR AFRICAN AMERICAN WIGS AND HAIR EXTENSIONS
Wigs and hair extensions manufactured for African American consumption
comprise an ethnically segmented product market. African American hair is unique
in texture and remarkably versatile, capable of being molded into different styles as
an expression of personal style.110 Yet with this versatility comes fragility; excessive
styling weakens the hair shaft so consumers often cannot use products designed for
other hair types.111 Products tailored to African American hair, therefore, are
generally not substitutable by hair products for other ethnic groups.112
Unlike many other consumer products, however, wigs and hair extensions are sold
in an ethnically misaligned market because retailers are predominantly firms owned
by Korean Americans. In the United States, this is one of the most enduring markets
where buyers and sellers are ethnically misaligned.
Equally enduring is the interethnic tension that typifies consumer-producer
interactions.113 Understandably, the fact that Korean Americans dominate the sale of
beauty products manufactured for African Americans has been the source of
consumer ire for decades. Among other criticisms, African Americans routinely level
generalizations that these markets are concentrated, and Koreans have monopolized
them.114 Pervasive as these charges are, the stranger feature is that they have been
repeated by scholars—often the scholars who built up the middleman minority

110. Ingrid E. Roseborough & Amy J. McMichael, Hair Care Practices in AfricanAmerican Patients, 28 SEMINARS IN CUTANEOUS MED. & SURGERY 103, 103 (2009):
The unique properties of hair of African origin are conducive to the
expression of personal style. The curved, elliptically-shaped hair shaft
lends itself to mouldable styles that retain their form and texture. When
heat or chemical agents are applied to African hair, the strands temporarily
or permanently release their intrinsic coil properties and can be fashioned
in innumerable ways. This immense diversity of options for hair care is
not without drawbacks. African hair is innately fragile. The inappropriate
use of styling aids may weaken the hair shaft and lead to breakage, scalp
inflammation, and potentially permanent hair loss.
111. Id.
112. For example, African American hair generally requires more conditioning to prevent
dryness. For wigs and hair extensions, styles with tighter curl pattern will generally be used
more by African American consumers than White or Asian consumers.
113. By “producers,” this Article refers generally to retailers of wigs and hair extensions
for African Americans.
114. See, e.g., Emma Sapong, Roots of Tension: Race, Hair, Competition and Black Beauty
PUB.
RADIO
NEWS,
(Apr.
25,
2017,
9:00
AM)
Stores,
MINN.
https://www.mprnews.org/story/2017/04/25/black-beauty-shops-korean-suppliers-roots-oftension-mn [https://perma.cc/EG7Y-DU7X]; GOOD HAIR (HBO Films 2009); Aron Ranen,
Black Hair, YOUTUBE (May 19, 2006), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p96aaTSdrAE
[https://perma.cc/J44M-QRAX]; Lloneau, supra note 20; see also #BlackOwned
HairCareChallenge, BLACK OWNED HAIR CARE CHALLENGE, https://www.
blackownedhaircarechallenge.com/ [https://perma.cc/9C2Z-YXVP] (last updated Oct. 22,
2021).
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literature—without working through the prerequisites of monopoly and
monopolization.115
This Section analyzes the retail of wigs and hair extensions to African American
as a paradigm of ESM markets. It begins with the structural dynamics that propelled
Korean American firms into the markets. Then it discusses the tactics that these firms
utilize to sustain their control. Finally, with a view toward infusing the discourse with
greater methodological rigor, this Section dissects the market power of Korean
American retailers.
A. Structural Tailwinds
Today’s Korean American hair retailers owe their start to macroeconomic
changes at the domestic and international levels in the late 1960s. Half a century ago,
when South Korea underwent its rapid economic development,116 wigs became one
of the country’s major exports.117 Hair collectors traveled the countryside of South
Korea, offering cash to or even bartering with women and girls in exchange for their
hair.118 Shorn hair was bundled and sold to wholesalers, who then resold it to wig
factories. Wig manufacturing is labor-intensive: hair must be combed and sorted for
length; if the hair is natural, it must also be disinfected, washed, curled, and dyed;
finally, hair is then sewn onto a cloth netting.119 Yet wage imbalances allowed wigs
to be made in South Korea, imported into the United States, and then sold at large
markups.120
By a twist of history, South Korean wig exports were greased by anti-Communist
policy during the Cold War. In the early 1960s, at the height of a hairpiece craze in
the United States, European supplies of hair ran low, so U.S. manufacturers began to
source hair from China.121 In 1965, however, the U.S. Treasury Department suddenly
banned the import of “Asiatic” hair, but hair was allowed through the embargo if it
could be traced to a non-Communist source.122 This move boosted the South Korean
wig industry while undercutting its Asian competitors.
Initially, South Korean wig imports were fueled by an explosion in consumer
demand, which grew 50-fold from 1960 to 1969.123 At that time, the market was

115. See, e.g., LIGHT & GOLD, supra note 76, at 20–21.
116. See GREGG BRAZINSKY, NATION BUILDING IN SOUTH KOREA: KOREANS, AMERICANS,
AND THE MAKING OF A DEMOCRACY (2007).
117. LIGHT & BONACICH, supra note 11, at 266 (“Korea exported 70 percent of the world’s
human-hair wigs.”).
118. Petrulis, supra note 19, at 8; see also How Wigs Tell the Story of Modern South Korea,
ECONOMIST (July 27, 2017), https://www.economist.com/asia/2017/07/27/how-wigs-tell-thestory-of-modern-south-korea [https://perma.cc/L4YW-B8FV].
119. Loretta Hall, Wig, HOW PRODUCTS ARE MADE, http://www.madehow.com/Volume3/Wig.html [https://perma.cc/YP5E-DLBE].
120. See LIGHT & BONACICH, supra note 11, at 27–37; Chin et al., supra note 19, at 494.
121. Petrulis, supra note 19, at 380.
122. Id. at 381–82.
123. See Leslie Gourse, What a Change of Hair Can Do; Wigs and Switches, Falls and
Beards – They’re Being Sold to the Tune of $500-Million a Year. A Growth Industry!, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 16, 1969.

363152-ILJ 97-2_Text.indd 89

2/25/22 10:22 AM

498

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 97:479

expanding so quickly that U.S. firms set up subsidiaries and stepped up sourcing.124
Hong Kong and South Korean businesses also rushed in. What distinguished the
Korean-operated supply chain from its U.S. and Hong Kong counterparts, however,
was its reliance on an extensive network of large manufacturers, small distributors,
and a government-backed bank that stretched from South Korea to the United
States.125 State support was critical. Funded by the South Korean government, the
Korean Exchange Bank established a branch in Los Angeles to lend to Korean
American-owned firms, many of them situated in the wig industry.126 The bank was
even encouraging these firms to borrow, thereby swelling the number of wig trading
companies in the early 1970s.127
Korean-owned businesses in the United States built up a network of wig
wholesalers and retailers, all relying on each other. Korean-language newspapers
circulating in the United States advertised the enterprises of Korean immigrants,
which helped connect immigrants; Korean importers also recruited Korean
immigrants as distributors.128 Newcomers to the wig business could navigate both
financing and sourcing solely within the transnational Korean community. Hence,
social networks linked the disparate players in the wig market.
The late 1960s and 1970s also coincided with shifting beauty standards. This was
the era of full beards and long hair, reflecting an ethos of rebellion. For those
consumers unable to naturally look the part, hairpieces provided a substitute—
though a costly one. At the time, wigs were sourced from human hair, and Italian
hair was considered top shelf, with “Oriental” hair a distant second.129 Mixing animal
hair was already in practice to concoct even cheaper alternatives.130 However, it was
the invention of Kanekalon by the Japanese conglomerate Kanekan in 1965 that
proved disruptive.131

124. Chin et al., supra note 19, at 494.
125. Id. at 499–501.
126. Id. at 498.
127. See id. at 499.
128. Yoon, Korean Immigrant Entrepreneurship, supra note 12, at 322 (“Korean
manufacturers sent their sales representatives to black areas to open retail stores. Korean wigimporters actively recruited Korean immigrants as retailers and peddlers in black areas to
expand their businesses. They even supplied wigs to Korean retailers on credit, so that Korean
immigrants could start their own wig businesses with very little initial capital.”).
129. A direct, if lengthy, quote from a chronicler of the time is illuminating on multiple
levels:
[T]raditional pacesetters are the hairpieces from Europe, led by soft,
shiny, olive-oil-nurtured Italian hair. It is far and away the most expensive,
with falls starting as high as $300 and full wigs going for as much as
$1,000 . . . . Spanish hair has been under something of a cloud since the
days when gypsies were accused of kidnapping long-haired children, and
returning them shorn . . . . Oriental hair is in general coarser than the
European variety, and cheaper. A hairpiece of Oriental hair costs roughly
a third of the price of a comparable European piece.
Gourse, supra note 123, at 67–69.
130. See id. at 69.
131. See About Kaneka, KANEKA, https://www.kaneka.co.jp/en/corporate/chronicle/
[https://perma.cc/L8NQ-77UP] (click on “1960~”).
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Possibly intended as a wool substitute,132 and modeled on Union Carbide’s fibers
for fake fur and doll hair,133 Kanekalon was a synthetic thread that became an
inexpensive substitute for human hair. Korean wig manufacturers acquired the
exclusive right to use the thread and incorporated it into their products.134 Along with
the technical breakthrough of stretch wigs, or hair attached onto elastic caps,135
Kanekalon helped South Korea transform from a source of human hair to a
manufacturer of wigs.136 By the mid-1970s, wigs had become South Korea’s third
largest export.137 For consumers, Kanekalon provided a low-cost alternative to
natural wigs, putting conformity to fashion trends within nearly universal reach.138
For African American women, who comprise a very specific market segment, the
mid-1970s marked a shift from the afros that had defined the Civil Rights era to
longer, straighter hair.139 This was reflected in the cultural icons of the day, including
Diana Ross and Donna Summer.140 Of course, hair is an individual’s expression of
identity, so we must not overgeneralize. We do know, however, that emerging
sources of natural and synthetic hair from Asia brought down the prices of wigs,
enabling more consumers to look the era’s part. At a time when relaxers and straight
hair were coming back into style, synthetic wigs allowed African American women
to quickly change up hairstyles.141
Synthetic wigs therefore ushered in throwaway fashion for hair—a boon to
Korean American wig retailers, who in the mid-1970s were suffering from the
deflation of their products, an economic recession, weakening consumer demand,
and intensifying intra-ethnic competition.142 Henceforth, these retailers would have
to do volume business to make up for diminishing margins. Yet were it not for
African American women, South Korean manufacturers and Korean American
retailers would likely not have survived. In less than half a decade, consumption of
wigs in the United States contracted by nearly forty percent, to a “core” constituent

132. Brooklyn White, How Black Women Fueled Kanekalon Hair’s Enduring Impact on
Pop Culture, StyleCaster (Jun. 4, 2020, 12:00 AM), https://stylecaster.com/beauty/kanekalonhair-history/ [https://perma.cc/S9XH-49GT].
133. Gourse, supra note 123, at 69.
134. YOON, ON MY OWN, supra note 12, at 111.
135. Gourse, supra note 123, at 69.
136. Chin et al., supra note 19, at 495.
137. Id. at 496.
138. See Gourse, supra note 123, at 69 (explaining that synthetic wigs cost $25, as opposed
to the $300 price tag for wigs from natural hair).
139. Previously, the late 1960s and early 1970s was the “golden era of wigs.” Yoon,
Korean Immigrant Entrepreneurship, supra note 12, at 323.
140. For annals of their hair evolution, see Nikki Brown, Diana Ross’ Unmatched Hair
Journey Through the Years, ESSENCE (Feb. 8, 2017), https://www.essence.com/
celebrity/diana-ross-hair-journey/ [https://perma.cc/NM73-MAJ8]; Nicole Marie Melton,
Hairstyle File: Donna Summer's Iconic Tresses, ESSENCE (May 18, 2012),
https://www.essence.com/hair/hairstyle-file-donna-summers-tress-transformation/ [https://
perma.cc/TRX5-257K].
141. See AYANA BYRD & LORI THARPS, HAIR STORY: UNTANGLING THE ROOTS OF BLACK
HAIR IN AMERICA 70–71 (2001).
142. YOON, ON MY OWN, supra note 12, at 112–13.
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of African Americans.143 This group comprised a lucrative and dependable segment,
and because of the inroads Korean Americans had already made into the market, they
would not be displaced.
Other seismic but fortuitous trends allowed Korean American firms to consolidate
control over the wigs and hair extensions markets. As Whites fled American cities,
Korean American retailers set up convenience stores, liquor stores, and hair care
businesses, taking advantage of cheap rents to open storefronts.144 Brick-and-mortar
establishments gave owners direct access to the consumers who would form their
base, so that when styles shifted, firms could quickly adapt by switching to newer
products. In this way, the early foray of Korean American retailers conveyed to this
set of producers a first mover advantage, which made them difficult to unseat.145
Their entry into the community also signified the demise of door-to-door retailing of
the 1930s, the mainstay of black retailers who sold black-made beauty products
directly to black consumers.146 In their place stood the brick-and-mortar store, where
Korean American retailers sold beauty supplies manufactured in Korea to black
consumers.147
Of all the structural tailwinds enjoyed by Korean American retailers, however, it
is their comparative advantage over African American competitors that has kept
them ahead. In many respects, a comparison of these two communities is a study in
contrasts. Where one group of producers has access to capital, whether through
rotating communal credit or state-backed import-export banks, the other is shut out
of mortgages, let alone business credit.148 Where one group enjoys the patronage of
a sovereign government that during the 1960s was still a quasi-developing country
but threw its entire weight behind its ethnic compatriots, the other group has faced
the systematic exclusion, marginalization, and persecution by its own state, a world
superpower. No study of this ethnically misaligned market would be complete
without reference to the disparity in buyer and seller economic power, and no study
of that economic power would be complete without mention of the headwinds
African American businesses perpetually face.
Nonetheless, Korean American dominance cannot be entirely chalked up to
structural or institutional advantages. The innovation and success of African
American entrepreneurs such as Madam C.J. Walker, who pioneered hair
straightening products and a direct retailing strategy, shows that African Americans

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Petrulis, supra note 19, at 372.
See Sapong, supra note 114.
See id.
See BYRD & THARPS, supra note 141, at 32, 79.
Id. at 96.
Compare Yoon, Korean Immigrant Entrepreneurship, supra note 12, at 494, with
RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW OUR GOVERNMENT
SEGREGATED AMERICA 9–10 (2017). In fact, there is evidence that the U.S. Small Business
Administration and Minority Business Development Agency played a significant role in
promoting Korean American businesses. See Tamara K. Nopper, Minority, Black and NonBlack People of Color: ‘New’ Color-Blind Racism and the US Small Business
Administration’s Approach to Minority Business Lending in the Post-Civil Rights Era, 37
CRIT. SOCIO. 651 (2011); Nopper, supra note 85.
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can break through.149 Nor is Walker an anomaly; numerous other Black-owned hair
care businesses have flourished despite the headwinds.150 For Korean American
retailers, then, we must also look at the role that this group played in fanning those
headwinds.
B. The Agency of Retailers
Structural trends may convey to one set of producers an advantage over others,
but the advantages are ephemeral. Structures shift, and advantages dissipate. This is
especially the case when producers and consumers are both communities of color;
the slight, relative advantages conveyed to each group fade quickly, and relations
between ethnically distinct producers and consumers are ever fluid.151 In other words,
the dominance of Korean American retailers could not have persisted through the
decades without the tactics utilized by Korean American retailers themselves—i.e.,
without their agency.
For African American consumers in this ethnically misaligned market, the
offenses of out-group producers are many. Consumers charge that Korean Americans
have monopolized the ethnic beauty products market,152 shutting out African
American retailers by stifling the flow from wholesalers.153 And if African
Americans have created new beauty products, Korean American retailers refuse to
carry them.154 African Americans have leveled so many charges at Korean American
retailers that the Internet is replete with these claims and the producer–consumer
relationship is clouded by a generalized, if amorphous, mistrust.155
In truth, the relationship between African American consumers and Korean
American suppliers had been poisoned for decades, for reasons beyond the inability
of competitors to penetrate the hair markets.156 African Americans had long
complained of mistreatment by Korean-owned businesses and periodically organized

149. BYRD & THARPS, supra note 141, at 35–36, 78–81. Walker was the first Black selfmade female millionaire. Id. at 183.
OWNED
HAIR
CHALLENGE,
150. See
Black-Owned
Brands,
BLACK
https://www.blackownedhaircarechallenge.com/hair-care-brands
[https://perma.cc/56U74TZS].
151. See supra note 81.
152. Lloneau, supra note 20 (“The Koreans control over 85% of all ethnic hair care
products sold in Beauty Supply Stores without regard as to who is the manufacture.”).
153. Why Do Koreans Own The Black Beauty Supply Business?, MADAMENOIRE (Sept. 27,
2010),
https://madamenoire.com/104753/why-do-koreans-own-the-black-beauty-supplybusiness/ [https://perma.cc/VC5S-ZNRG] (“Today, there are over 9,000 Korean-owned
beauty supply stores serving a billion dollar market for Black hair. Between manufacturing,
distributing and selling these hair care products, Korean entrepreneurs appear to control all
major components. . . . [T]here are only four central distributors serving beauty supply stores
in the country and these Korean owned distributors discriminate against Black store owners in
order to maintain their monopoly in the market.”).
154. See Ranen, supra note 114.
155. See supra notes 114, 152–55 and accompanying text.
156. See CLAIRE JEAN KIM, BITTER FRUIT: THE POLITICS OF BLACK-KOREAN CONFLICT IN
NEW YORK CITY (2000); Heon Cheol Lee, Conflict between Korean Merchants and Black
Customers: A Structural Analysis, in KOREANS IN THE HOOD, supra note 64, at 113.
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boycotts against them.157 In 1992, these old grievances exploded into protests that
destroyed Korean businesses in Los Angeles after the acquittal of Latasha Harlins’s
killer and Rodney King’s assailants.158
Charges of exclusion find some support in the literature from sociology about
ethnic entrepreneurship. Consistent with Wilson and Martin’s finding that Cuban
American entrepreneurs pool resources within their co-ethnic communities,159
Korean American retailers deal almost exclusively with Korean and Korean
American wholesalers.160 Wholesalers are more likely to extend credit, offer
installment payment plans, and sell at lower prices to co-ethnic retailers, which can
be important to thinly capitalized startups.161 A degree of informality characterizes
Korean American in-group commercial transactions; rather than checking a
supplier’s credit, wholesalers often transact through “handshake deals.”162 These
business customs are emblematic of what sociologists call “vertical integration,”
whereby materials are sourced from, spending restricted to, and wealth retained in
co-ethnic communities.163 Conceptually, the application of vertical integration to an
entire ethnic group is slightly different than the approach of antitrust law, which tends
to examine vertical integration at the firm or industry level. Nonetheless, ethnic
cohesion characterizes Korean American ventures in a variety of industries, mostly
concentrated in low-income communities of color, from apparel to ethnic beauty
supplies.
While a vertically integrated wig and hair extensions market keeps wealth from
flowing out of the Korean American community, it excludes participation by African
American competitors. Given the market’s evolution, very few African American
suppliers of wigs and hair products exist,164 and they have been unable to procure
hair products from Korean American distributors.165 African American
manufacturers have also faced difficulty convincing Korean American retailers to
carry their products.166 This can be attributed partly to language barriers; for product
catalogs and even industry magazines are frequently published only in Korean.167
Yet Korean and Korean American wholesalers have banded together in the past to
shut out competitors, going well beyond the passive exclusion of language.
In 1975, the Department of Justice brought suit against the Korean Hair Goods
Association of America, Inc. (the “Association”) for (i) conspiring to regulate the

157. See KIM, supra note 156, at 145–46.
158. See Park, supra note 65; Oliver et al., supra note 65.
159. See Wilson & Martin, supra note 81.
160. Lee, supra note 77, at 1406–07.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.; Wilson & Martin, supra note 81.
164. But see Black-Owned Brands, supra note 150.
165. Why Do Koreans Own the Black Beauty Supply Business?, supra note 153.
166. See Ranen, supra note 114, at frame 5:50 (discussing Kizure, a Black-owned
manufacturer of curling irons and other styling tools, allegedly blacklisted from Korean
American-owned shops).
167. See, e.g., BEAUTY TIMES: THE MAGAZINE FOR THE ETHNIC BEAUTY INDUSTRY,
http://www.beautytimes.com/ [https://perma.cc/Z57Z-MX66]; see also Ranen, supra note
114, at 2:57.
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price and resale conditions of imported wigs and (ii) excluding wig importers and
distributors from the resale market.168 The Association was a New York organization
whose members imported wigs and hair products from Korea for wholesale and retail
in the U.S.169 Noting that most wigs sold in the U.S. are made out of synthetic fibers
and that the “vast majority” of synthetic wigs are manufactured in South Korea and
imported to the United States,170 the Department of Justice contended that the
Association regulated the price and distribution of wigs by restricting its membership
and working with an association of South Korean wig manufacturers and exporters
(the KEA) to channel the distribution of wigs through the Association.171 Although
DOJ brought suit under Section 1 of the Sherman Act,172 this was a scheme of using
exclusion to facilitate price maintenance, as seen in classic Section 2 cases.173 In the
end, the consent decree enjoined the Association from (i) fixing wig prices, (ii)
preventing the procurement of wigs for resale, informational exchanges designed to
fix prices, (iii) communicating its membership to the KEA, and (iv) unreasonably
restricting its membership.174
The Association’s consent decree offered a lens into how the Korean American
distribution chain for wigs and hair extensions was able to consolidate its hand in the
U.S. market. However, it is tantalizingly short. It also stands as the only proceeding
that delves into the workings of this market with any rigor. Ultimately, the Justice
Department’s legal action shows that the charges of African American consumers
and competitors are not mere speculation—that as far back as 1972, the Korean
American distribution chain was attempting to fix prices and resale conditions for
wigs and hair extensions.175 To fill in the analytical gaps in the consent decree and
infuse the charges of African American consumers and competitors with rigor, we
must work through the requisite steps under antitrust law. Otherwise, the charges
languish in imprecision. The next Section undertakes that work.
III. MARKET POWER OF KOREAN AMERICAN RETAILERS
This Section uses antitrust theory and doctrine on market power to more clearly
frame the presence of Korean American retailers. To be condemned, many
exclusionary and coordinating practices require a finding of market power as the very

168. See United States v. Korean Hair Goods Ass’n of Am., Inc., 40 Fed. Reg. 57696
(Dep’t of Just. Dec. 11, 1975) (Notice of Proposed Consent Judgment).
169. Id. at 57698.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. See United States v. Korean Hair Goods Ass’n of Am., Inc., No. 75-3069, 1976 WL
1219 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 1975 ).
173. E.g., Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S.
85 (1984); JTC Petroleum Co. v. Piasa Motor Fuels, Inc. 190 F.3d 775 (7th Cir. 1999).
174. Korean Hair Goods Ass’n of Am., Inc., 1976 WL 1219.
175. United States v. Korean Hair Goods Ass’n of Am., Inc., 40 Fed. Reg. at 57696–98
(Notice of Proposed Consent Judgment and Competitive Impact Statement).
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first step.176 Market power is easy to express conceptually—the power of a producer
to raise prices above competitive levels—but often difficult to prove in practice.177
Frequently, market power is gauged through the indirect steps of defining the
relevant market and then measuring the defendants’ market shares. While the market
definition/market share paradigm has come under assault through the decades, it
remains the most popular means of assessing market power.178 More importantly for
our purposes, this paradigm generates broader insights about the preferences and
pressures of African Americans, which might be missed if we were to assess market
power more directly—for instance, by going straight to anticompetitive effects.179
This Section begins by discussing the application of the market definition/market
share paradigm to the retail of wigs and hair extensions to African Americans. Then
it moves onto other conceptualizations of market power.
A. Oblique Measures of Market Power
1. Market Definition
For wigs and hair extensions, market definition is not difficult, but the exercise
can be enlightening.180 Despite our preliminary focus on the products themselves
(e.g., wigs), the complaints of monopoly and monopolization emanate from the retail
market, where the interaction between consumers and producers happens to be most
ethnically misaligned. In the retail of wigs and hair extensions to African Americans,
which occurs mostly in brick-and-mortar stores, commerce is dominated by Korean
American-owned shops.181 Consumer–producer frictions coincide with—and are
therefore augmented by—interracial tensions.
The product market clearly encompasses brick and mortar stores, where African
American women typically procure wigs and extensions. Stores provide convenient
access to myriad products; consumers can easily compare prices, textures, and colors,
especially for last-minute purchases prior to a trip to the salon. Demand, especially
in the form of traditional storefronts, is inelastic—one of the two common features
of a precisely defined market (the other feature being supply inelasticity).182

176. HOVENKAMP, supra note 21, § 3.1.
177. At its core, market power gauges the difference between position of the accused firm
and a competitive counterfactual. Daniel A. Crane, Market Power Without Market Definition,
90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 31, 37 (2014).
178. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define Markets?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 437, 440
(2010). For an excellent summary of approaches to market definition, see Sean P. Sullivan,
Modular Market Definition, 55 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1091 (2021).
179. This is especially the case for dynamic industries. See Howard A. Shelanski,
Information, Innovation, and Competition Policy for the Internet, U. PA. L. REV. 1663, 1673–
74 (2013).
180. Wigs and extensions are also lumped together in Ranen, supra note 114, at frame 0:24
(“Even though [African Americans] make up only 10% of the American population, they buy
70% of all wigs and extensions . . . .”).
181. See Lloneau, supra note 20; Sapong, supra note 114; Why Do Koreans Own the Black
Beauty Supply Business?, supra note 153.
182. HOVENKAMP, supra note 21, at 93.
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Demand for wigs and extensions is inelastic due to social preferences that are
often infused into law. In the United States, long, straight hair is favored over other
styles, a predisposition that reflects the markers of whiteness.183 Because blackness
is defined in opposition to whiteness,184 the natural hair of African Americans, who
are racialized as Black, has often been viewed as undesirable.185 Thus, products from
relaxers to hair extensions accommodate these preferences.186 Of course, social
preferences are fluid, and natural hair has been celebrated, if episodically.187
The law has internalized these norms into its systems of incentives. In several
jurisdictions, employers can fire or demote employees for how they wear their hair
with no repercussions.188 Hair discrimination cannot necessarily be couched as
legally actionable discrimination under Title VII.189 And the closer one gets to the
textured appearance of natural hair, the more one hazards exclusion, termination, or
demotion.190 Even where legal protections exist, African Americans understand that
natural or natural-looking hair can hinder professional advancement.191

183. See Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Another Hair Piece: Exploring New Strands of
Analysis under Title VII, 98 GEO. L.J. 1079, 1093 (2010) (“[S]ociety’s normative ideal for
women’s hair [is] straight hair, which hangs down as it grows longer—hair that is not naturally
grown by black women.”).
184. See generally FLOYA ANTHIAS & NIRA YUVAL-DAVIS, RACIALIZED BOUNDARIES:
RACE, NATION, GENDER, COLOUR, AND CLASS AND THE ANTI-RACIST STRUGGLE (1992); CAROL
ANDERSON, WHITE RAGE: THE UNSPOKEN TRUTH OF OUR RACIAL DIVIDE (2016); IAN HANEY
LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (10th ed. 2006).
185. Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 183, at 1107 (“In a society where straight, long, fine
hair (compared to black hair) is viewed not only as the norm but as the ideal for women, tightly
coiled black hair easily becomes categorized as unacceptable, unprofessional, deviant, and too
political.”). See also Matt Donnelly, Inside ‘America’s Got Talent’: Ousted Judges Had
Complained of Toxic Culture, VARIETY (Nov. 26, 2019, 3:38 PM), https://
variety.com/2019/tv/news/americas-got-talent-gabrielle-union-julianne-hough-toxic-cultureousted-judges-1203417447/ [https://perma.cc/9Z7D-3YWW] (stating that actress Gabrielle
Union was criticized by the producers of the show America’s Got Talent for hairstyles that
were “too black”).
186. Roseborough & McMichael, supra note 110, at 105 (“[R]elaxer is a chemical
compound applied at varying intervals to permanently break hydrogen disulfide bonds along
the hair shaft and release the tight curl pattern.”).
187. See BYRD & THARPS, supra note 141, at 54–59 (Afros in the 1960s), 67–68 (Afros in
Blaxploitation films of the 1970s), 169–70 (natural hair in the 1990s). For contemporary
natural hair trends, see Natural Hair Movement Drives Sales of Styling Products in US Black
Haircare Market, MINTEL (Dec. 17, 2015), https://www.mintel.com/press-centre/beauty-andpersonal-care/natural-hair-movement-drives-sales-of-styling-products-in-us-black-haircaremarket [https://perma.cc/AA77-U9WW].
188. See D. Wendy Greene, Title VII: What’s Hair (And Other Race-Based
Characteristics) Got To Do With It?, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 1355, 1370–75 (2008) (analyzing
Eatman v. United Parcel Service, 194 F. Supp. 2d 256 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) and other cases).
189. Id.
190. In Eatman, African American UPS drivers were told to cover “unconventional
hairstyles, which included ‘dreadlocks,’ ‘braids,’ ‘corn rolls,’ a ‘dew rag,’ and a ‘pony-tail.’”
194 F. Supp. 2d at 259.
191. See Donnelly, supra note 185.
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Although we are defining our market as the retail of wigs and extensions, it is still
illuminating to analyze the products sold. One theme that emerges from doing so is
the socially embedded inelasticity of demand for items that produce straight hair.
This inelasticity spills over to retail and puts consumers at the mercy of retailers.192
The second theme is that not all African American hair products are fungible. Even
though many products have been invented to alter the length and texture of African
American hair,193 these products are not reasonably interchangeable because the
associated processes are different: relaxers chemically alter the texture of hair coils,
sometimes at the risk of chemical burns, while wigs and extensions are worn over
hair to alter the apparent length and curl pattern. And interchangeability is the
hallmark of market definition: all products that are reasonably interchangeable, or
can substitute for one another, must factor into product market definition.194
Even within wigs and extensions, we can further distinguish products on two
additional fronts. First, there is a difference between products that replicate tighter
curls versus products that mimic straight hair. Wigs and extensions might perform
similar functions, and more textured hairpieces might not be good substitutes for
straight hairpieces. Second, there is a difference between wigs and extensions made
from human hair and those made from synthetic materials. The former is much higher
quality and more expensive than the latter; and even within human hair, there are
gradations.195 For our purposes, we focus on human hair, which entails a different
supply chain than synthetic hair. Again, we note that wigs and hair extensions are
not the same as the venue in which they are sold—here, we focus primarily on the
latter.
As for supply elasticity, assessment comes with complications as well. After
displacing door-to-door salespeople, storefronts enjoyed a decades-long lock on the
retail market. Offering immediate access to a variety and large quantities of products,

192. The consequences are not merely economic. African Americans have long
complained of condescending treatment by Korean American shopkeepers, a complicated
dynamic that is informed partially by the need for products sold and the lack of alternative
venues. See KIM, supra note 156, at 1–5. Of course, counterexamples abound. See Julie Lee
Merseth, Race-ing Solidarity: Asian Americans and Support for Black Lives Matter, 6
POLITICS, GROUPS, AND IDENTITIES 337, 349 (2018) (“[I]t is less obvious why Black Lives
Matter support among Koreans stands out significantly, especially set against the historical
backdrop of black–Korean conflict. . . . Because Korean communities comprise substantial
numbers of first-generation immigrants as well as undocumented immigrants, it is possible
that Korean support for Black Lives Matter follows in part from the movement’s visible and
outspoken efforts to support immigrant rights, particularly for undocumented immigrants of
color.”).
193. See Roseborough & McMichael, supra note 110, at 104–06; Onwuachi-Willig, supra
note 183, at 1089.
194. See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 394, 400, 404
(1956); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962). This is the concept of
cross-elasticity: where substitutes are many, cross-elasticity is high. Yet interchangeability and
cross-elasticity are prone to error. See Kaplow, supra note 178, at 482–91 (explaining why
elasticity should be emphasized over cross-elasticity).
195. For example, Remy hair, where cuticles are intact and going in the same direction, is
considered to be higher end. See Ankush Gupta, Human Hair ‘‘Waste’’ and Its Utilization:
Gaps and Possibilities, 2014 J. WASTE MGMT. 1, 3–4.
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traditional stores seem to have even fended off challenges from newer outlets such
as Internet sales and salon-driven sales.196 Our market should be defined as all
retailers to encompass these newer outlets; even so, with brick-and-mortar stores
predominating, the daylight is slim between all retailers and physical stores.
Nonetheless, supplier elasticity is difficult to pin down because there is a glut of
firms in any geographic market for consumers to choose from—those firms just
happen to be mostly owned and operated by Korean Americans. In the retail of wigs
and hair extensions to African Americans, competition is intense. It was intra-ethnic
competition, after all, that helped drive the industry toward decline in the 1970s.197
Yet despite the abundance of retailers, there are very few non-Korean alternatives.
Can it be said, then, that this market is characterized by supplier inelasticity if we
consider only the number of firms? Regardless of the answer to this narrow question,
the picture emerges of a supply network that competes intensely within itself but
cooperates to exclude competition from out-group insurgents.
To be sure, challengers have managed to break through. Instead of procuring wigs
and extensions from Korean wholesalers, however, they rely on nontraditional
sourcing. Mayvenn, a Black-owned retailer that started in 2012 and is funded by
Serena Williams and venture capital powerhouse Andreessen Horowitz, sources hair
from China and sells either directly to consumers or through salons.198 Indique, cofounded in 2007 by African American and Indian American partners, sources from
India, where hair is donated as part of religious ceremonies, and sells products
through its proprietary salons.199 The extent of consumer preference for these upstarts
is difficult to quantify, these alternatives do not command a substantial share of the
product market yet.200
As a harbinger of imminent troubles, U.S. Customs and Border Protection
recently seized thirteen tons of shipments of human hair imports from China.201 The
hair was alleged to have been shorn from Uighur internees at concentration camps
for Muslim minorities in Xinjiang, western China.202 Muslim internment is one of

196. See supra notes 181–82 and accompanying text.
197. YOON, ON MY OWN, supra note 12, at 112–13.
198. Adams, supra note 13; About Us, MAYVENN, https://shop.mayvenn.com/about-us
[https://perma.cc/C2AT-KEJQ].
199. See Our Company, INDIQUE HAIR EXTENSIONS, https://www.indiquehair.com/
pages/our-company [https://perma.cc/Q2VR-3CA7].
200. Mayvenn has been valued at $100 million, while the entire hair extensions market is
valued at $6 billion. See Adams, supra note 13. Its valuation does not necessarily reflect its
current share of the market, only its potential. Of course, much more in-depth empirical work
must be done to break out exactly how much of that $6 billion figure pertains to African
American consumers and what share Mayvenn and traditional retailers control of that sector.
201. Withhold Release Orders and Findings, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION,
https://www.cbp.gov/trade/programs-administration/forced-labor/withhold-release-ordersand-findings [https://perma.cc/G9KN-XB3Q] (search under “China” and entries 33 and 34 for
“Hair Products”).
202. See Martha Mendoza, AP Exclusive: Hair Weaves, from Chinese prison camps seized,
WA. POST (July 1, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/religion/ap-exclusivehair-weaves-from-chinese-prison-camps-seized/2020/07/01/11be0df2-bb9c-11ea-97c16cf116ffe26c_story.html [https://perma.cc/L9LF-SC9Z]; Shalway Evans, That Hair You Just
Bought Could Be from an Internment Camp in China, ESSENCE (Dec. 6, 2020),
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the worst ongoing violations of human rights in the world;203 any supply chain
entangled, or even alleged to implicate, the labor or body parts of internees could
stain an entire industry.204 At the very least, if Chinese hair continues to generate
controversy, then it will prove to be an unstable source for insurgent retailers such as
Mayvenn.
2. Market Share Calculation
With the above considerations in mind, let us define the market as the brick-andmortar retail of wigs and extensions made from human hair for consumption by
African Americans. From here, market share calculation can reveal with greater
precision the extent of dominance by Korean American suppliers. By most accounts,
Korean American businesses control approximately seventy to eighty-five percent of
the “ethnic beauty products” market.205 Vastly more research must be done to
measure the market share of Korean American businesses in the relevant markets.
However, the anecdotal evidence from African American consumers is that
purchasing wigs and hair extensions invariably requires navigating Korean-owned
stores.206
Even if “saturation” of the relevant markets by Korean American businesses is
assumed, market share analysis will almost certainly fail traditional measures of
concentration because numerous small firms play in our ESM market. Customarily,
market dominance is attributed to one very large producer (a monopoly) or a small
number of fairly large producers (say, an oligopoly of four or five producers).207 Yet
because producers are small and compete intensely, this feature belies our typical
understanding of concentration.
Very few detailed studies have been conducted on the numbers of ethnic beauty
stores (where wigs and extensions are sold) in a geographic market. One study by
the sociologist Jennifer Lee, who relied on interviews with Korean proprietors,

https://www.essence.com/beauty/beauty-news/customs-seizes-hair-suspected-from-chineseprison/ [https://perma.cc/5C2S-36XN].
203. See Lindsay Maizland, China’s Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS (March 1, 2021, 7:00 AM), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinasrepression-uighurs-xinjiang [https://perma.cc/B3S5-U8DQ]; Marlise Simons, Uighur Exiles
Push for Court Case Accusing China of Genocide, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/06/world/asia/china-xinjiang-uighur-court.html [https://
perma.cc/XLY2-B6PA].
204. See Mendoza, supra note 202.
205. See, e.g., Sapong, supra note 114 (70%); Lee, supra note 77, at 1405 (80%); Lloneau,
supra note 20 (85%). Cf. BYRD & THARPS, supra note 141, at 96 (pinning the distribution of
ethnic hair care products at “primarily” “45 to 50 percent,” and “60 percent” Asian).
206. See, e.g., Ranen, supra note 114.
207. Of course, the power of numerous small producers can be augmented if they band
together—say, through a trade association. In American Column & Lumber Co. v. United
States, for example, the American Hardwood Manufacturers’ Association was comprised of
approximately 400 members, with 365 of them engaged in the information exchange plan. 257
U.S. 377, 391 (1921). In National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, the
society’s worldwide membership was 69,000, and consulting engineers, who were at the heart
of the no-bid rule, numbered 12,000. 435 U.S. 679, 682 (1978).
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pegged the number of ethnic beauty supply stores in New York City at 300, with
eighty percent of them “Korean owned.”208 Professor Lee’s interviews took place in
three largely African American neighborhoods in New York: East Harlem, West
Harlem, and Jamaica, Queens.209 While she does not specify the numbers of stores
in each neighborhood, we can take Jamaica as an example and assume that (1) it
comprises a relevant geographic market and (2) it has twenty such stores.210 Further,
if we assume that the intense competition among Korean American retailers yields a
market where no single supplier runs away with market share, then our shares might
look something like this:
Table 1. Hypothetical Market Shares in a Relevant Geographic Market
Firm

Market Share (%)

Firm

Market Share (%)

1

13

11

4

2

12

12

4

3

8

13

3

4

7

14

3

5

6

15

3

6

6

16

3

7

5

17

2

8

5

18

2

9

5

19

2

10

5

20

2

We can start with the k-firm concentration ratio, setting k at 4 to get the commonly
utilized four-firm concentration ratio, or the sum of the market shares of the four
largest firms in the market. Here the four-firm ratio would be forty.211 A more precise
measure is the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI), or the sum of the squares of the

208. Lee, supra note 77.
209. Id.
210. The African American population in Queens is 141,387 (58.6% of 241,275 residents).
Jamaica/Hollis QN12 Demographics, NYU FURMAN CENTER, https://furmancenter.org/
neighborhoods/view/jamaica-hollis. This comprises approximately 7.5% of New York’s 1.992
million African Americans. QuickFacts New York City, New York, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/newyorkcitynewyork [https://perma.cc/QH4H-E859]. If
we take Professor Lee’s figures to be accurate, 7.5% of 300 is 22.5 ethnic beauty stores for
our geographic market. Indeed, a quick Google maps search of “ethnic beauty supply Jamaica
Queens” returns 22 results.
211. See, e.g., William G. Shepherd, Concentration Ratios, in NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY
OF ECONOMICS 563 (Eatwell et al. eds., 1st ed. 1987); U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., MERGER
GUIDELINES (1968).
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market shares of all firms. Under the above hypothetical, the HHI would be 682,
which does not even cross the threshold of moderate concentration.212
If all but three of the firms (assume, e.g., Firms 7–10) were owned by Korean
Americans, then the Korean-owned firms would occupy eighty percent of the market,
but concentration is typically not measured in this way.213 Instead, concentration is
assessed at the level of individual firms.
While the above illustration is purely conjecture, it incorporates an important
insight from the literature on Korean American small businesses: they crowd into
specific niches and compete intensely against one another.214 The success of one
enterprise prompts others to start a competing enterprise, often in close proximity to
the first.215
B. Retailer Diversity
Our defined market would likely not qualify as concentrated under the market
definition/market share paradigm. However, there are other measures of market
power whose application to antitrust may be more appropriate, if experimental. As a
salient example, economists have proposed looking at the way ecologists measure
biological diversity—by assessing the richness and evenness of a geographical
habitat, where richness “is . . . the number of different kinds of organisms or species”
and evenness “compares the similarity of the population size of each of the species .
. . .”216 Applying these measures to the market for wigs and hair extensions, we would
find that richness is negligible, and evenness skews toward a lopsided quantity of
Korean American firms. This result is equivalent in ecology to a habitat dominated
by one species.217
Biologists and ecologists quantify richness and evenness through the Simpson’s
Diversity Index, which expresses the probability “that two . . . organisms chosen at
random and independently from the population will be found to belong to the same
species.”218 The Index shifts the analysis from the level of individual organisms to
the level of species. Incidentally, HHI incorporates aspects of richness and evenness

212. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & FTC, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 5.3 (2010). The HHI
is the more commonly used index of concentration today, but both measures have their flaws.
HHI captures the differences in firm size more accurately but errs on overestimating the
importance of that difference, while the four-firm concentration ratio overlooks and
undervalues firm size disparity. HOVENKAMP, supra note 21, § 12.4a2.
213. Note that Black Owned Hair Care Challenge only has one African American retailer
listed for Queens. See Listing of Black Owned Beauty Supply Stores, FACEBOOK,
https://18530fa3-d2e0-49d5-a67b-522187070841.filesusr.com/ugd/182cb9_
81b90ee249eb43f288e60510c6938688.pdf [https://perma.cc/2JNH-WGWL].
214. See YOON, ON MY OWN, supra note 12, at 112–13.
215. Id.
216. Paolo M. Adajar, Ernst R. Berndt, & Rena M. Conti, The Surprising Hybrid Pedigree
of Measures of Diversity and Economic Concentration 2, 11, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch.,
Working
Paper
No.
26512,
2019),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w26512
[https://perma.cc/78FP-GM7W].
217. Id.
218. Id. at 12; see also Edward H. Simpson, The Measurement of Diversity, 163 NATURE
688 (1949).
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as well; for instance, squaring firm market shares augments the effect of (and
therefore accounts for) disparities in firm size. Still, the Simpson’s Diversity Index
gives us license to think of a market in terms of its producer diversity, providing the
theoretical basis to look beyond individual firms and at the level of ethnic groups.
The Simpson’s Diversity Index has not been adapted to antitrust contexts,219
though diversity has featured prominently in some antitrust-adjacent areas of law.
Telecommunications law, for instance, has grappled with viewpoint diversity in the
midst of media consolidation,220 with the Federal Communications Commission once
proposing a diversity index based on the HHI to identify media markets where crossownership limits should be retained.221 Antitrust scholars have also suggested
alternatives to the narrow focus on price and efficiency, upholding diversity in
markets where rivals compete on nonprice differentiation.222 In close cases such as
ours, where traditional market power paradigms yield ambivalent results, diversity
might call for antitrust intervention.
The wig and extensions market is an apt setting to test the viability of principles
such as diversity and consumer choice. Retailers compete intensely, eroding margins
and pushing prices toward convergence.223 The products themselves are fairly
homogenous, varying only in texture, length, and curl pattern. What distinguishes
retailers from one another, then, is convenience, selection, and, perhaps most
importantly, the ethnic identities of each firm’s managers and owners. These three
factors—convenience, selection, and identity—are important to consumers and
balance one another in nuanced ways. Yet only the ethnic identities of retailers are
meaningful to market power. From that standpoint, the prevalence of Korean
American-owned firms makes this market extremely concentrated, with this group
wielding market power.
There are reservations, though, with this conceptualization of diversity, which pits
Korean American retailers against African American competitors and consumers.
Racial and ethnic formation is a dynamic, contested process,224 but this strain of
market power analysis reduces Korean Americans to one homogenous block and
African Americans to another, extrapolating the degree of diversity from their ratio.
In reality, so many factors influence racial and ethnic formation that it is understood

219. But see Miriam Marcowitz-Bitton & Jacob Nussim, Regulation of Book Markets, 97
WASH. U. L. REV. 835, 895 n.425 (2020).
220. See Daniel E. Ho & Kevin M. Quinn, Viewpoint Diversity and Media Consolidation:
An Empirical Study, 61 STAN. L. REV. 781 (2009).
221. See Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 18 FCC Rcd. 13620,
13775 (2003). After legal challenges, the index was dropped. See Prometheus Radio Project
v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372 (3d Cir. 2004).
222. See Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Using the “Consumer Choice” Approach to
Antitrust Law, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 175 (2007). Relatedly, on the use of competition law to
advance small and medium-sized businesses, particularly in countries where an ethnic
minority controls commerce, see Fox, supra note 47.
223. YOON, ON MY OWN, supra note 12, at 112–13.
224. NADIA Y. KIM, IMPERIAL CITIZENS: KOREANS AND RACE FROM SEOUL TO LA xiv
(2008).
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to be ever fluid.225 Racial order is transient and should be historically situated.226 To
the extent that race signifies “social conflicts and interests” embedded in human
bodies,227 its meaning constantly shifts as those conflicts and interests reorient
themselves.
Among Korean American shopkeepers, whom we presume to constitute a uniform
block for the purpose of assessing market power, there are notable differences. Many
did not stand with Soon Ja Du, who fatally shot Latasha Harlins in 1992.228 Then, as
today, Korean Americans have worked with African Americans to build up their
communities in pan-racial solidarity.229 More pointedly, Korean American retailers
may be pursuing divergent sourcing strategies. The reentry of China as a global hair
supplier,230 coupled with Internet platforms such as Alibaba, allows Korean
American retailers to bypass co-ethnic wholesalers just as much as it allows African
American competitors an alternative source of products.
The above factors complicate the picture of Korean American solidarity, either as
an ethnic unit or as a production unit. Ultimately, then, any metric of market power
that aggregates the multitudes of discrete retailers, even if to assess market diversity,
does so at the expense of intra-ethnic nuance.
C. Anticompetitive Effects
Finally, to avoid the pitfalls of market diversity and market definition/market
share, we can attempt to detect market power through direct evidence of
anticompetitive effects.231 Unfortunately, there is as much disagreement over what
constitutes direct evidence as there is over market definition.232
One long-established form of direct evidence is exclusionary conduct; courts have
inferred market power from the power to exclude competition.233 In our case, this
requires looking to the upstream market of wig and extensions wholesale and

225. Omi and Winant break race into three critical factors: ethnicity, class, and nation. See
OMI & WINANT, supra note 26, at 11–13.
226. Id. at 61.
227. Id. at 55.
228. KIM, supra note 224, at 181 (L.A. Korean community asserting Du was “mentally
unbalanced”). The community also blamed mainstream American media for inflaming
violence by relentlessly airing footage of the shooting, glossing over White mistreatment of
both Korean Americans and African Americans. Id. at 73.
229. Of course, episodes such as Los Angeles 1992 can reinforce ethnic cohesion. Kim,
Home is Where the Han Is, supra note 89.
230. I say “reentry” because in the 1960s, China was a significant supplier until the U.S.
banned the import of Chinese hair products. Ranen, supra note 114.
231. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 51 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (showing direct
evidence of Microsoft’s monopoly power).
232. See Crane, supra note 177, at 45 (summarizing seven mechanisms of direct evidence
from lower court decisions).
233. See id. at 45 n.82 (citing Heerwagen v. Clear Channel Commc’ns, 435 F.3d 219, 227
(2d Cir. 2006); Geneva Pharms. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs. Inc., 386 F.3d 485, 500 (2d Cir.
2004); PepsiCo., Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 315 F.3d 101, 107 (2d Cir. 2002); Conwood Co. v.
U.S. Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768, 783 n.2 (6th Cir. 2002); Tops Mkts., Inc. v. Quality Mkts.,
Inc., 142 F.3d 90, 98 (2d Cir. 1998)).
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distribution, which is a necessary input into the retail of these products.234 An
exclusionary strategy might proceed as follows: a consortium of wig and extensions
wholesalers and distributors, all Korean American firms, refuses to sell products to
non-Koreans. The consortium might explicitly refuse to deal with any non-Korean
retailers, or it might conspire with South Korean wig manufacturers to export only
to the consortium, rather than selling directly to any retailer based in the U.S. This
was the very strategy of the Korean Hair Goods Association of America, Inc. (the
“Association”) when the DOJ brought suit in 1975. The Association collaborated
with the association of South Korean wig manufacturers and exporters (KEA) to
restrict the flow of wigs to its competitors in the U.S. by, among other strategies,
mandating that import and distribution flow through the Association rather than
directly to retailers.235 Because most wigs were manufactured in Korea at the time,236
this maneuver choked off the supply line for out-group competitors. KEA and the
Association both enjoyed market power in their respective markets—the
manufacture and export of wigs in South Korea and the import and distribution of
wigs into the U.S.
To a large extent, claims of exclusion have not abated today. African American
retailers routinely complain that Korean wholesalers refuse to deal with them,
thereby shutting them out of hair products to resell.237 However, exclusion as an
indicator of market power is difficult to square, both doctrinally and within the wig
and extensions market specifically.
While some courts have endorsed the inference of market power from
exclusionary conduct,238 this inference is beset by circularity because recovery for
exclusion is permitted only if the alleged excluder possesses market power.239 One
widely recognized exception to this circularity is where the excluders are able to raise
their rivals’ costs.240 Examples abound of such exclusionary schemes—for example,
the foreclosure or denial of access to a necessary input by incumbents signals their
market power.241 In the wig and extensions market, the clearest instance of this type

234. On input control in antitrust, see Ramsi A. Woodcock, Inconsistency in Antitrust, 68
U. MIAMI L. REV. 105 (2013).
235. See U.S. Dept. of Justice, United States v. Korean Hair Goods Ass’n of Am., Inc.,
Notice of Proposed Consent Judgment and Competitive Impact Statement Thereon, 40 Fed.
Reg. 57696, 57697 (Dec. 11, 1975).
236. Id. at 57698.
237. Ranen, supra note 114.
238. See, e.g., Brooke Groupe Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209
(1993).
239. Crane, supra note 177, at 64–65.
240. See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising
Rivals’ Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986).
241. This is the crux of the essential facilities claim, which is established if (1) a monopolist
controls a facility that (2) a competitor is unable to practically or reasonably duplicate and (3)
use of the facility is denied to the claimant, even though (4) it is feasible for the monopolist to
provide access. MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132–33 (7th
Cir. 1983). For its case law lineage, see Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V.
Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 415 (2004); Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472
U.S. 585, 611 (1985); Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 382 (1973); United
States v. Terminal R.R. Ass’n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383, 411–13 (1912). For examples, see,
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of exclusion would be any concerted effort among Korean manufacturers,
wholesalers, or distributors to deny African American retailers access to hair
products. If that transpires, then the insurgents would have to find new sources of
raw materials (e.g., hair from India) and possibly manufacture the hair products
themselves.242 Or insurgents would have to source manufactured products from
someplace other than South Korea.243
Proving exclusionary conduct by Korean American importers, wholesalers, and
distributors is not difficult. There appear to be only a few such firms (as opposed to
nearly 10,000 retailers), which more easily facilitates coordination; collectively,
these firms wield market power.244 It is an altogether different matter, however, to
prove that this exclusion raises the costs of African American retailers. The rise of
China as a source of wigs and extensions may be drastically cutting suppliers’ costs.
Relatedly, the fact that hair in India is donated means that raw material costs might
be even lower if South Korea is bypassed. More work must be done to figure out the
margins of sourcing from South Korea versus China and India. For now, the fact that
some African American competitors are thriving—and two are outright thriving—
amidst the exclusion undercuts any argument of Korean market power.
Exclusion is commonly a consequence of vertical integration. Wholesalers and
resellers, or an upstream facility and a downstream monopolist, must be unified to
some degree for them to foreclose markets or raise rivals’ costs. To be sure, ethnic
bonds go a long way toward fostering commercial cohesion,245 but the vertical
integration of Korean wholesalers and Korean American retailers is not frictionless.
Although outsiders cannot easily peer into these relations, we can glean some
insights from the public record of litigation. The handful of cases implicating Korean
American wig and extensions retailers reveals that manufacturers and wholesalers
can be extremely demanding of retailers, pressing them to agree to quotas of regular
shipments backed by personal guarantees.246 More generally, these cases show that
ethnic beauty supplies is a rough-and-tumble industry, where business partners can
turn on one another.247 Co-ethnic bonds must therefore not be presumed.
Of course, this may also be an industry where in-group incumbents compete
intensely against one another but are willing to band together to stymie out-group
insurgents. This is the model from other markets such as finance.248 Yet those

Felix B. Chang, Financial Market Bottlenecks and the “Openness” Mandate, 23 GEO. MASON.
L. REV. 69 (2015). For theoretical support, see Patrick Rey & Jean Tirole, A Primer on
Foreclosure, in 3 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 2147, 2155 (Mark Armstrong &
Robert H. Porter eds., 2007).
242. This appears to be the Indique model. See Our Company, supra note 199.
243. This appears to be the Mayvenn model. See Adams, supra note 13.
244. See Ranen, supra note 114.
245. Wilson & Martin, supra note 81, at 156.
246. Daweoo Int’l (America) Corp. v. Chade Int’l, Inc., 1992 WL 175600 (N.D. Ill. July
21, 1992).
247. See T3Micro, Inc. v. SGI Co., Ltd., No. CV 09-08783, 2010 WL 11597603 (C.D. Cal.
July 28, 2010).
248. See Felix B. Chang, Second-Generation Monopolization: Parallel Exclusion in
Derivatives Markets, 2016 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 657, 661–64 (2016) (analyzing the
derivatives markets).

363152-ILJ 97-2_Text.indd 106

2/25/22 10:23 AM

2022]

ETHNICALLY SEGMENTED MARKETS

515

markets are typically dominated by a small oligopoly of large producers. Here, we
are dealing with a large and diverse world of small retailers.
Nonetheless, if Korean American firms are analyzed as a cohesive unit, then their
staying power would push antitrust toward finding an offense and devising a
remedy—either for express coordination or, more experimentally, parallel exclusion.
If competitors or consumers can produce evidence of express coordination, then this
market would show that collusive and exclusionary schemes may be more stable than
antitrust theory holds.249 This determination may depend on the intuition from
sociology that an ethnic group withdraws into itself, strengthening co-ethnic bonds,
when threatened by exogenous forces.250 Here the external threats would be
competition and interracial tensions. Alternatively, at the wholesale level, Korean
American firms may well be determining independently (rather than working
together) to deny out-group rivals access to a necessary input. Even still, antitrust
doctrine around noncooperative oligopolies may regard this as a form of parallel
exclusion that militates toward intervention.251
Ultimately, market power is an attempt to express the delta, or difference, between
the market at hand and a perfectly competitive counterfactual.252 This bears out in
the various mathematical expressions of market power.253 With the advent of China
and India as suppliers of hair and wigs, as well as platforms to connect retailers and
even consumers with non-Korean suppliers, that delta may be diminishing. More
empirical work on price and marginal cost must be done, of course, but this market
may be converging toward perfect competition more swiftly than ever before.
IV. UPENDING ANTITRUST ASSUMPTIONS
The market for wigs and hair extensions defies several entrenched notions in
antitrust. Maddeningly, this ESM market overturns the assumptions of both
noninterventionist and progressive flanks. This Section explores the theoretical and
doctrinal complications that come with ESM markets, which inject race and ethnicity
into antitrust paradigms. The Section begins with how antitrust would have to expand
for African American competitors and consumers to bring suit against Korean
American producers. Then it examines how the wig and extensions market

249. See, e.g., Selten, supra note 23; Levenstein & Suslow, supra note 23; Dick, supra
note 23.
250. See Turner & Bonacich, supra note 25, at 154.
251. See C. Scott Hemphill & Tim Wu, Parallel Exclusion, 122 YALE L.J. 1182, 1237–38
(2013).
252. Crane, supra note 177, at 33 (“[M]arket power only makes sense as an expression, in
relative terms, of the distance between the market as it is and a competitive counterfactual. . .
. Since antitrust policy aims to reduce the delta between a plausible competitive counterfactual
and the actual circumstances, market power should be understood as that delta—the infirmity
that antitrust law could correct.”).
253. E.g., the Lerner index: L = (P – MC)/P, where P denotes price and MC marginal cost.
Here the delta is between price and marginal cost. In other words, in a perfectly competitive
world, price would equal marginal cost, so the excess of price over marginal cost reveals a
firm’s market power. See Kaplow, supra note 178, at 445–46.
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undermines progressive antitrust’s conceptions of welfare. The Section concludes
with additional avenues for future research.
A. Group Boycotts, Refusals to Deal, and Facilitating Practices
A finding that Korean American retailers collectively possess market power
would not be dispositive in litigation. To prevail, African American challengers
would have to couch their claims in conformity with antitrust doctrine, which
presently does not offer many viable avenues. The cultural and linguistic bonds of
ethnically homogenous retailers might well comprise a plus factor that suggests
parallel conduct is likely to be the product of collusion or tacit agreement.254
Arguably, even in the absence of agreement, these bonds may constitute a new
facilitating practice that induces coordination. Plus factors and facilitating practices
require proper calibration of the burdens of proof in some of the thorniest antitrust
settings.255 With ESM markets, where efficiencies abound and conduct is more
equivocal, the calculus becomes that much more convoluted.
For competitors, the first potential claim is that the actions of Korean American
wholesalers and retailers, from the refusal to carry African American-made products
to the refusal to extend African American retailers credit, amount to a group boycott
of—or a horizontal agreement to refuse to deal with—African American entrants. At
its inception, courts had subjected group boycotts to per se illegality, the highest level
of scrutiny in antitrust.256 Yet, as elsewhere in antitrust, condemnation of these
schemes has softened in recent years, particularly where procompetitive
justifications lurk.257 This swing has been so extreme that the presumption on group
boycotts is now validity under a rule of reason approach, rather than illegality under
a per se approach.258
As a vertical strategy, refusal to deal in facilitation of exclusion is accorded even
greater deference. Refusal to deal is often brought as an essential facilities claim

254. For a taxonomy of plus factors, see William E. Kovacic, Robert C. Marshall, Leslie
M. Marx & Halbert L. White, Plus Factors and Agreement in Antitrust Law, 110 MICH. L.
REV. 393 (2011). For the genesis of the debate over whether parallel conduct should be
condemned under antitrust laws, see Donald F. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under
the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals To Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655, 677–
81 (1962); Richard A. Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21
STAN. L. REV. 1562 (1969).
255. Burdens of proof are frequently the targets of calls for reform. See, e.g., Fiona Scott
Morton, Pascal Bouvier, Ariel Ezrachi, Bruno Jullien, Roberta Katz, Gene Kimmelman, A.
Douglas Melamed & Jamie Morgenstern, Stigler Committee on Digital Platforms: Market
Structure & Antitrust Subcommittee Report, in STIGLER COMMITTEE ON DIGITAL PLATFORMS
FINAL REPORT 23, 77–78, 100–01 (2019).
256. See, e.g., E. States Retail Lumber Dealers’ Ass’n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 614
(1914); Am. Med. Ass’n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943); Klors v. Broadway-Hale
Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959).
257. See, e.g., NYMEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 134–35 (1998). For analysis
on this doctrine’s application to an ethnically segmented market similar to the one at hand, see
Barak D. Richman, The Antitrust of Reputation Mechanisms: Institutional Economics and
Concerted Refusals to Deal, 95 VA. L. REV. 325, 340–46 (2009).
258. HOVENKAMP, supra note 21, at 239.
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against a defendant who controls a necessary input (typically, an infrastructure with
network effects) into a market.259 Customarily, the defendant is a monopolist, or at
least an oligopoly whose market power is indisputable.260 Yet even if African
American challengers were to establish that Korean American retailers harbored
market power, the essential facilities doctrine has been eviscerated as a theory of
harm.261 The high-water mark of the duty to deal doctrine has long passed,262 and
today’s courts simply view a refusal to deal as the province of businesses.
Procompetitive efficiencies can also excuse information sharing, a strategy among
competitors that can be challenged as a facilitation device for collusion and exclusion
even in the absence of express agreement. Claimants might allege, for example, that
the publication of product catalogs and trade journals in the Korean language
operates to signal inventory pricing while shutting out non-Korean retailers. Cultural
and linguistic homogeneity might well be a setting in which our conception of
facilitating practices should expand to reflect greater likelihood of collusion.
However, these bonds could lower transaction costs for retailers, resulting in savings
for consumers. In their defense, then, incumbent retailers might point to the fact that
South Korean manufacturers and exporters are the dominant suppliers; as such, U.S.
distributors and retailers can communicate more easily with these suppliers in
Korean.
The likelihood of success of these claims is difficult to quantify. On one hand, the
wigs and extensions market is characterized by fungible products and inelastic
demand,263 and these information exchanges might pertain to price264 or further a
group boycott.265 On the other hand, however, information exchanges are more
suspect in concentrated markets,266 and African American insurgents must be able to
point to some sort of actual exchange of information, ideally within the incriminating
areas.267 This claim seems to turn, again, on market power, which itself turns on the
appropriateness of analysis at the firm versus ethnic group level.
Efficiencies do abound in the wig and extensions market. The degree of vertical
integration among co-ethnic manufacturers, distributors, and retailers means that
products can be moved quickly to any locality in the United States. Korean American
retailers in African American communities can also spot new trends and transmit this

259. See supra note 241.
260. See, e.g., Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 381–82 (1973); Verizon
Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 415 (2004).
261. See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 411 (“We have never recognized [the essential facilities
doctrine], and we find no need either to recognize it or to repudiate it here.”) (citations
omitted).
262. See, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 611
(1985); Otter Tail, 410 U.S. at 372.
263. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 21, at 236 (stating that information exchange is certain
to be condemned if the market is concentrated, the price is fungible, and demand is inelastic).
264. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 21, at 237 (price information exchanges suspicious). See
also Am. Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921); United States v. Am.
Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371 (1923).
265. See E. States Retail Lumber Dealers’ Ass’n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914).
266. HOVENKAMP, supra note 21, at 236.
267. For a similar discussion, see Richman, supra note 257, at 352–55.
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information to South Korean manufacturers, who can respond rapidly.
Simultaneously, the rough-and-tumble competition among retailers means that prices
should converge toward competitive, rather than supracompetitive, levels.
The central question raised by this ESM market is therefore: Who is harmed by
the actions of Korean American firms in this market—African American consumers
or competitors? If prices are competitive, the answer would not be consumers. The
same would be true if the quality of products were high or if the varieties were
expansive. In such instances, the market would be functioning properly, and antitrust
would not need to intervene.
Indeed, group boycotts, refusals to deal, and information exchanges are injurious
only to competitors, with offsetting efficiencies for consumers. The very use of
“ethnic misalignment” for this market suggests that it is competitors who are harmed
because they are denied the chance to sell to co-ethnic consumers.268
To work through the implications, we might imagine a market in which an African
American insurgent were to break through and eventually run away with market
share—say, if Mayvenn or Indique were to displace the vast majority of Korean
American retailers. In such a market, with a monopoly firmly in control, prices would
trend toward supracompetitive levels. Which, then, would African American
consumers prefer? The ethnically misaligned market where thousands of out-group
producers compete against one another but shut out in-group competitors, or the
ethnically aligned market dominated by one producer with clear market power?
The answer is unclear. While pertinent to the wig and extensions market, this
question also underscores the ambivalence of the consumer welfare standard in
antitrust; this market is characterized by intense intra-producer competition, yet
consumers are unsatisfied by their choices.
As for the more basic questions of whether Korean American firms bear market
power and whether antitrust would condemn their business practices, the results are
indeterminate. In the face of such indeterminacy, it would seem unwise to concoct
new theories on market power or facilitating practices. However, inaction means that
antitrust doctrine will have come down in favor of one ethnic group. Such is the
quandary at the heart of an ESM market where both producers and consumers are
peoples of color. Err for producers, and antitrust will have endorsed a community of
mostly immigrant entrepreneurs who have opted out of the mainstream U.S.
economy because of racial barriers. Err for consumers, and antitrust will have upheld
a racial group that has been denied participation in the sale of a product that is central
to their identity.
B. Progressive Antitrust
Of all the assumptions that ESM markets invert, the most paradigm-shifting may
be how these markets undermine the beliefs of progressive antitrust. Antitrust today
has been reinvigorated by its progressive flank. Loosely called the “new Brandeis
school,” a group of scholars and advocates have argued for stronger antitrust laws
and enforcement as redress for society’s most pressing problems.269 These scholars

268. Thanks to Harry First for pointing this out.
269. See Maurice E. Stucke & Ariel Ezrachi, The Rise, Fall, and Rebirth of the U.S.
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share a distrust of firms that have attained a certain size, or “bigness,” and a faith in
antitrust to look after noneconomic goals.270 Properly enforced, antitrust can foster
innovation271 while countering inequality and the concentration of political power.272
The fundamental step to achieving these goals is overturning the Chicago school’s
singular focus on consumer welfare.273 Arguably, this narrow, noninterventionist
construction of antitrust has permitted tech platforms to erode competition, privacy,
social equality, workers’ rights, and even truth—negative externalities that platform
users do not immediately feel.274 Because tech platforms operate in zero-price
markets, where users do not pay anything tangible for services, harms to consumers
are exceedingly difficult to measure. These contentions rest on two core assumptions:
(i) that, at a minimum, consumer welfare may very well be diminished in
concentrated markets, even zero-price markets,275 and (ii) that, more ambitiously,
antitrust can and should advance noneconomic goals such as the competitive process
and democratic ideals.276
However, the injection of race and ethnicity confounds these assumptions. In
ESM markets, consumers might prefer to buy from co-ethnic producers. For instance,
in our example of wigs and hair extensions, African Americans may happily choose
one large Black-owned retailer over disparate, numerous, and small Korean
American firms—even if over time, that firm becomes a monopolist. (Such is the
ambition, after all, of Mayvenn, whose backers envision it as a “platform” for

Antitrust Movement, HARV. BUS. REV. (Dec. 15, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/12/the-rise-falland-rebirth-of-the-u-s-antitrust-movement [https://perma.cc/6UT5-GA3F]; Lina Khan &
Sandeep Vaheesan, Market Power and Inequality: The Antitrust Counterrevolution and Its
Discontents, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 235 (2017).
270. E.g., TIM WU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST IN THE NEW GILDED AGE (2018);
ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, BREAK ‘EM UP: RECOVERING OUR FREEDOM FROM BIG AG, BIG TECH, AND
BIG MONEY (2020); Lina M. Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox¸ 126 YALE L.J. 710, 737
(2017).
271. See C. Scott Hemphill & Tim Wu, Parallel Exclusion, 122 YALE L.J. 1182, 1185
(2013).
272. See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY: HOW TODAY’S DIVIDED SOCIETY
ENDANGERS OUR FUTURE (2012); ROBERT B. REICH, SAVING CAPITALISM: FOR THE MANY, NOT
THE FEW 29–47 (2015). But see Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust and Wealth Inequality, 101
CORNELL L. REV. 1171, 1173 (2016).
273. See Sandeep Vaheesan, The Twilight of the Technocrats’ Monopoly on Antitrust?, 127
YALE L.J. FORUM 980 (2018); Lina M. Khan, The Separation of Platforms and Commerce,
119 COLUM. L. REV. 973, 983 (2019).
274. See John M. Newman, Antitrust in Zero-Price Markets: Foundations, 164 U. PA. L.
REV. 149 (2015); Sanjukta Paul, Antitrust as Allocator of Coordination Rights, 67 UCLA L.
REV. 378 (2020); Hiba Hafiz, Labor Antitrust’s Paradox, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 381 (2020); Erika
M. Douglas, Monopolization Remedies and Data Privacy, 24 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2020);
Morton et al., supra note 255, at 23, 32–33 (2019).
275. Newman, supra note 274, at 201–03.
276. See Vaheesan, supra note 273. For further discussion, see John B. Kirkwood & Robert
H. Lande, The Fundamental Goal of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers, Not Increasing
Efficiency, 84 NOTRE DAME. L. REV. 191 (2008); Barak Orbach, How Antitrust Lost Its Goal,
81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2253 (2013).
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hair.)277 If an Amazon of ethnic beauty supplies does emerge, with all its pernicious
social effects, what would consumers opt for—ethnic and racial solidarity or
competition and small businesses?
And if ethnic or racial solidarity were a goal that antitrust recognizes, should we
also be concerned with preferences and social cohesion on the producer side?278
More pointedly, how would progressive antitrust scholars weigh these
considerations against one another? As new Brandeisians push for noneconomic
goals, weighing harms against efficiencies becomes ever more complicated.279 With
co-ethnic bonds in the picture, that task is downright Sisyphean. Here consumer
preferences—and, relatedly, the consumer welfare standard—may yield the opposite
result of a total welfare standard. A dominant hair platform may impair competition,
privacy, the environment, and small businesses. However, even for reformers fixated
on consumer welfare, the quantification and weighing of ethnic and racial pride in
these markets is an impossible task.
A Black-owned monopoly of wigs and extensions might well be embraced by
African American consumers despite its size. It would be specious to dismiss this
sentiment as a “noneconomic” goal of racial pride. There is a long history of
expropriation of African American innovations and property by other racialized
groups, particularly Whites.280 After desegregation, when the artificial barriers
between White and African American businesses were lifted, many Black-owned
businesses crumbled. In their place stood large White-owned companies that sold to
African Americans at a substantial markup.281 Manufacturers of ethnic beauty
supplies have followed the same trajectory.282 This history imbues the choice to “buy
Black” with profound significance, as more than simply “consumer preferences.”283

277. See Adams, supra note 13.
278. Flawed and criticized as it is, Ohio v. American Express invites considerations of
tradeoffs between two sides of a multisided market. See 138 S.Ct. 2274 (2018); see also John
B. Kirkwood, Antitrust and Two-Sided Platforms: The Failure of American Express, 41
CARDOZO L. REV. 1805 (2020).
279. See John B. Kirkwood, Tech Giant Exclusion, FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021).
280. See Teresa Wiltz, Black Inventors: Innovators Who Changed the Way We Live, THE
ROOT (Feb. 21, 2014), https://www.theroot.com/black-inventors-innovators-who-changedthe-way-we-live-1790868453 [https://perma.cc/6TYU-D8KR]; REBECCA SKLOOT, THE
IMMORTAL LIFE OF HENRIETTA LACKS (2010) (tracing the life of Henrietta Lacks, whose cells,
taken without her knowledge, sparked several medical breakthroughs).
281. See, e.g., Mehrsa Baradaran, Jim Crow Credit, 9 UC IRVINE L. REV. 887 (2019)
(banking).
282. E.g., Revlon, Sally Beauty, Strength of Nature, and L’Oréal. See 52 Black-Owned
Beauty Supply Stores You Should Know, OFFICIAL BLACK WALL STREET (Jan. 27, 2016),
https://blog.obws.com/black-owned-beauty-supply-stores/ [https://perma.cc/ZH48-LZNP];
BYRD & THARPS, supra note 141, at 96.
283. See 53 Black-Owned Hair Care Brands You Can Support, OFFICIAL BLACK WALL
STREET (Apr. 25, 2017), https://blog.obws.com/black-owned-haircare-beauty-products/
[https://perma.cc/85VM-Q9NK] (“With Black women and men purchasing nine times more
beauty and grooming products than any other ethnic group, yet owning less than 1% of that
market share, it’s only right that we support the brothers and sisters who have stepped into the
industry and created products for us, by us.”). For an intimate profile of the conflicted
positionality of African American employees in a Korean-owned beauty supply shop, see
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It must be mentioned that wigs and extensions take a sizeable toll on the
environment and likely human rights.284 Hair is shipped from East Asia to
wholesalers in the U.S. and then out to distributors and retailers. With the entry of
small Internet-based retailers, these shipments are happening on demand rather than
in bulk, incurring enormous carbon footprints for each bundle. Now that some of this
hair is very likely sourced from Uighur concentration camps, the industry is
implicated in egregious human rights abuses.285 This controversy is part of a familiar
trope. Not for the first time, the brunt of environmental and human rights baggage
will be borne by African Americans, the most visible consumers of wigs and
extensions.286 And the industry’s “greenwashing,” too, will fall to African
Americans.287
C. Future Research
The curious phenomenon of ESM markets will generate more quandaries for
research. For instance, should the preferences and buying power of an ethnically
homogenous consumer block be constrained by law, whether as monopsony or
discrimination?288 Elsewhere, civil rights laws rein in the discernment of producers
so that schools, hotels, and swimming pools cannot refuse service on the basis of
race.289 Nor can employers (a classic monopsony) hire or fire on the basis of race.290
Relatedly, the common carrier doctrine forces innkeepers and other public
accommodations to offer open, nondiscriminatory service—a paradigm that has
evolved into some of antitrust’s core concepts, like net neutrality.291 Yet no
comparable laws govern consumer buying power in ESM markets.

Michael Corkery, A Korean Store Owner. A Black Employee. A Tense Neighborhood, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/15/business/beauty-store-raceprotests.html [https://perma.cc/64CL-A6SJ].
284. See Gupta, supra note 195, at 2; Mendoza, supra note 202; Evans, supra note 202.
285. See Mendoza, supra note 202; Evans, supra note 202.
286. See Cong. Black Caucus Found., Inc., African Americans and Climate Change: An
Unequal Burden 84–85 (2004), https://www.ebony.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/
CBCF_REPORT_F.pdf [https://perma.cc/58JG-RLL2] (noting that African Americans are
disproportionately harmed by regressive carbon and energy taxes or permits).
287. See Rebecca Wright, Ivan Watson & Isaac Yee, “Black Gold”: How Global Demand
for Hair Products Is Linked to Forced Labor in Xinjiang, CNN (Oct. 2020),
https://edition.cnn.com/interactive/2020/10/asia/black-gold-hair-products-forced-laborxinjiang/ [https://perma.cc/A7EP-5SRR] (quoting Professor Tiffany Gill on the “sad” fact that
“the accusations of forced labor are associated with products used primarily by the African
American community, given the long, painful history and legacy of forced labor that was a
part of American chattel slavery”) (internal quotations omitted).
288. For this point, I am grateful to Ramsi Woodcock.
289. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a) et seq. (2006).
290. Id. § 2000(e).
291. See Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. OF TELECOMM. &
HIGH TECH. L. 141 (2005); Susan P. Crawford, Transporting Communications, 89 B.U. L.
REV. 871, 878–80 (2009); see also Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 80 Fed. Reg.
19737 (Apr. 13, 2015), (promulgating net neutrality rules); Restoring Internet Freedom, 83
Fed. Reg. 21927 (June 11, 2018) (repealing net neutrality rules).
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Further, if conduct in ESM markets do violate antitrust law, could the same result
hold in markets where producers are drawn from one gender and consumers from
another, if incumbents stifle entry by rivals of the consumers’ gender?292 Reasoning
from race,293 perhaps social cohesion within the same gender is comparably
important to racial and ethnic cohesion.
Finally, what remedies should antitrust pursue for anticompetitive conduct in
ESM markets? What resources should we devote to overseeing remedies and
reordering these markets? The question of proper remedies is no less important to
ESM markets—but also no less byzantine.294
CONCLUSION
The stakes are high for getting ESM markets right. In the United States,
interactions between peoples of color often unfold as commercial transactions in
markets where groups are pushed into close quarters, hemmed in on all sides by
structural racism and systemic exclusion. When, as in the wigs and extensions
market, those markets are ethnically misaligned, intergroup tensions can be inflamed.
Such tensions exploded in 1992 with racial unrest in Los Angeles, but it was not an
anomaly. Korean American-owned wig stores were destroyed during protests in
Ferguson, Missouri, in 2014 after prosecutors failed to indict Michael Brown’s killer
and also in Baltimore in 2015 after the funeral of Freddie Gray.295
As the very first step, a proper understanding of ESM markets is critical. This
Article has synthesized the disparate literature on ethnically segmented markets to
create the theoretical foundation for ESM markets. In using the wig and extensions
market as an illustration, the Article reveals how ESM markets challenge traditional
notions of market power and oligopoly stability. Hence, ESM markets and antitrust
doctrine are mutually illuminating.
More empirical work must be completed before we can determine whether
antitrust law conveys any recourse to African American retailers and consumers in
the wig and extensions market. However, for the first time in decades, this market is
changing quickly from new sourcing strategies that have bolstered the hand of
African American competitors. The old guard of Korean American retailers is also
aging out, and their children may eschew this hardscrabble business, with its intense
competition, diminishing margins, and interracial tensions.296 Given the dynamic
process of racial and ethnic formation, these children may not even feel the same
fidelity toward co-ethnic bonds. Thus, by the time antitrust has devised a solution,
this market may have outgrown the need for redress.

292. I thank Michal Gal for this insight.
293. SERENA MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE: FEMINISM, LAW, AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS
REVOLUTION (2014).
294. For a summary of thinking on antitrust remedies, see A. Douglas Melamed,
Afterward: The Purpose of Antitrust Remedies, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 359 (2009).
295. Petrulis, supra note 19, at 397.
296. For a stark example of the second generation transcending the station of the first, see
Jay Caspian Kang, The Many Lives of Steven Yeun, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Feb. 3, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/03/magazine/steven-yeun.html [https://perma.cc/P58HRKZN] (parents of iconic actor Steven Yuen ran an ethnic beauty supply store in Detroit).
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